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2Abstract
The objective to this thesis is to examine which measurable firm variables that are the main
determinants of corporate debt structure amongst Nordic rated companies, and if "fallen
angel" companies experience an alteration to their debt structure once downgraded. Previous
studies have indicated several coherences that are proven valid for mainly the US market.
Our study seeks to examine if these coherences also are applicable to the Nordic countries,
and if there are other present determinants that are not discussed in previous empirical
literature. On the basis of several univariate and multivariate regression models and tests,
we have found evidence that support profitability, firm size, intangible assets and rating to
play an integral part in determining corporate debt structure. Our results indicate that each of
them is influencing the utilization of different types of instruments. However, our research
does not indicate any significant changes in debt structure when "fallen angels" are
downgraded.
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81. Introduction
This study investigates how companies chose their debt structure. Our analyses include
Nordic firms which have carried a long-term credit rating by Moody's Investor Service
before 2012, and an assessment of their debt structure in the period between 1stof January,
2001 and 31stof December, 2011.
The majority of empirical studies and literature on capital structure decisions treat debt as
homogenous. In reality, companies have access to a wide variety in types of debt with
different priority, maturity and cash flow claims. Instead of treating debt as uniform, we
wish to highlight the importance of separating debt by various characteristics. We seek to
answer the following research question:
Whichmeasurable,firmspecificvariablesare the maindeterminantsof corporatedebt
structurefor rated companiesin the Nordics,and how is debt structurealteredby a
`fallenangel-downgrade'?
To be able to answer our research question, we have conducted a comprehensive data
gathering process and developed a highly accurate dataset on the debt structure of Nordic,
rated companies from 2001 through 2011, and furthermore relied on univariate and
multivariate regressions and statistical tests to analyse firm specific variables and their
relationship to different types, sources and priorities of debt.
The study is structured in the following way. The next section contains a presentation of
theories on capital structure decisions and relevant empirical research regarding debt
structure. Based on the research history, we recognize that the vast majority of studies on
debt structure are done on U.S. firms. The main previous study engaging this topic is Rauh
and Sufi (2010).
In the third section we present our data sample and the assessed information sources in order
to determine the historical debt structure of the sample companies. Furthermore, we present
how the data was gathered, the classification of the final data sample, and firm specific
variables assessed appropriate for analyses to answer our research question.
Based on a comprehensive dataset on debt structure, a number of regressions and statistical
tests are conducted in the following section to identify the underlying relationships with firm
9specificvariables.Followinga presentationof the results fromthese and an examinationof
the whetherthe debt structureof `fallenangels' changeswhen downgraded,is a discussion
of our findings in relation to establishedempirical research literature and theory. After
discussing the limitations in our methodology and proposals for further research, we
concludeon what we assessto be the main determinantsof corporatedebt structurein the
Nordiccountries.
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2. Previous studies and literature
Classicalcorporatefinancetheory and theoreticalstudieson capital structuretreat debt as
homogenousfor the most part. However,some studiesrecognizedebt heterogeneity,and
attemptto gasp the reasonsfor it.
2.1 Theories on capital structuredecisions
There are two main theories that have gained footholdto explainhow firms decide their
capitalstructure.
2.1.1 The Trade-off Theory
The term trade-off theory is used to describea familyof related theories,all statingthat
firms choosetheir capital structureby balancingcosts and benefitsof alternativeleverage
plans (Frank& Goyal,2007).The originalversionof the trade-offtheorywas developedin
the wake of the Modigliani-Millertheorem(Modigliani& Miller, 1963),when corporate
income tax was added to the irrelevanceproposition(Frank & Goyal, 2007). Kraus and
Litzenberger(1973)providea classicstatementof the trade-offtheoryas they statethat the
optimalleverageof a firmis determinedby a trade-offbetweenthe tax benefitsof debt and
the bankruptcycost. Accordingto Myers (1984),a firmwill typicallyset a target leverage
ratiobalancingdebt tax shieldsagainstthe costof bankruptcy.
2.1.2 The Pecking Order Theory
The PeckingOrder theory stems from Myers (1984)and assertsthat the cost of financing
increaseswith asymmetricinformation,and that financingcomesfrominternalfunds,debt
financingand equity(Frank& Goyal,2007).The model statesthat firmsare rankingtheir
preferredsourceof financing.Companiesare first preferringinternalfundingif available;
otherwisethey are relyingon externalfinancing,preferringdebtover raisingequity(Myers
& Majluf,1984).Thetheory,in its simplestform,statesthat equityis a lesspreferredwayto
raise capitalbecausewhenmanagers,that has informationon the true conditionof the firm,
issue new equity, investors believe it is because the managers think that the firm is
overvalueddue to the lemonproblem.As a result, the investorswill place a lowervalueto
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the new equity issue. This again, will make the managers passing from issuing equity
(Cadsby,Frank& Maksimovic,1990),andratherpreferretainedearningsor debt.
2.2 Studieson debtstructure
None of the theoriespresentedin section2.1 grasps the fact that there are many different
typesof debt with differentcharacteristics,and no consistenttheoryhas been establishedto
uniformly grasp the properties of corporate debt structure. However,many studies have
attemptedto explain relationshipsthat determinethe choice of a debt structureby firms.
Otherempiricalstudiesrecognizethat companiesstructuretheir debt into severalcategories
withregardsto type,priorityandmaturityandtype.
Bolton and Freixas (2000) seeks to build a compliant equilibriummodel of the capital
market to explain some well-knownstylized facts. This is done by exploringthe optimal
structureof bank debt, bond loans and equity. By combiningideas from several already
existingtheorieson capitalstructureunder asymmetricinformation,their model shows that
bond financingis mainlyfoundin matureand stablecompanieswhereasbank financingand
equityare the main sourcesof fundingfor risky start-ups.Boltonand Freixas(2000) state
that the key distinctionbetweenbondsand bank debt is the monitoringabilityof banks, and
that companiestum to banks as a source of financingprimarilybecause banks can help
companiesthroughfinancialdistress.Furthermore,they find that high-qualityfirms do not
valuethe abilityof banksto investigate,andrely on arm's-lengthlendersto avoidadditional
costsof bankdebtrelatedto monitoring.Thisflexibilityis costlybecausebanksface costsof
capitalthemselves.Consequently,they find that firms shouldmove from bank to non-bank
debt as ratingimproves,whichis supportedby Diamond(1991a),Chemmanurand Fulghieri
(1994)and BootandThakor(1997).
Hackbarth,Hennesseyand Leland(2007)recognizethat the originaltrade-offtheoryfails to
addressdebt structure,and seek to understandwhetherthe trade-off theory can be used to
explain corporatedebt structure.They find that the theory can explain why weak firms
almost solelyutilize bank debt, as bank debt capacityis no constraint,and hence, the firm
doesnot needto issuemarketdebtto obtainthe desiredlevelof debttax shields.1naddition,
they find that the trade-offtheoryoffersexplanationsfor why strongercompaniesuse bank
debt up to their lowerdebt capacityand augmentwith bond loans and place the bank loan
senior.Theyalsorecognizethat the percentageof marketdebt to totaldebt is increasingwith
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firm size. These findingsare reconciledwith several other studies, such as Houstonand
James(1996),Johnson(1997)andDenisandMihov(2003).
Park (2000) investigatesthe reasonswhy lenderswith monitoringdutiesmay be seniorin
priority,and developsa theoryof optimaldebt structurewith a presenceof a severemoral
hazard problem. The central idea is that the optimal debt contract for a firm delegates
monitoringto a singlelender,typicallya bank. This allowsthe monitoringlenderto utilize
the full return from its monitoring activities, and is hence maximizingthe monitoring
incentive.Presenceof other senior,non-monitoringlenders,will forcethe monitoringlender
to share the return, and hencereduce the incentivefor monitoring.Accordingto Park, this
explainswhy debt contractsare prioritizedand why short-termdebt is senior to long-term
debt. Anotherconclusionof this theoryis that maturityand covenantstructureswill be set
accordingto the senioritystructure.
Diamond(1991b)analysesdebt maturitystructurefor borrowerswith private information
abouttheir futurecreditrating.Thepaperseeksto understandthe choiceof debtmaturityby
firms, and how the choice is affectedby their credit rating. Diamond(1991b)developsa
model to explainwhy borrowerswho rely heavilyon short-termdebt such as commercial
paper are a mixof veryhigh andlowratedcompanies,whilethemiddleratedcompaniesuse
more long-termdebt.Theutilizationof short-termdebtby higherratedcompanieswill allow
them to choose to refinancewhen good news arrives and their rating rises. Lower rated
borrowerswill prefer long-termdebt,but someverylowratedborrowershaveno choicebut
to use short-termdebt,despitethe controlthat it givesto lenders.
Barclay and Smith (1995) provide an empirical examinationof the priority structure of
corporateliabilitiesfrom 1981through 1992 for a vast numberof companies.The paper
highlightsthe variationin prioritystructureacrossfirms,and examinesseveralhypothesesto
explainthis. They find that firmswith high growthopportunitiesissue fewer fixed claims
such as lease and debt, and more preferredstock. Additionally,they find that firms with
higher growthprospectstend to have fixed claims that are concentratedin fewerpriority
classes,and that larger firms tend to have more dispersedfixedclaims. Smithand Warner
(1979) suggestthat a firm withmore growthoptionsin its investmentopportunitiesshould
have a greaterportionof long-termliabilitiesin seniorprioritycategoriessuchas capitalized
leases or secured debt. Barclay and Smith (1995) also find a significantlypositive
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relationship between frim size and the level of ordinary debt, subordinateddebt, and
preferredstock,but a significantlynegativedependenceof secureddebton firm size.
Rauhand Sufi (2007)examinethe compositionand priorityof corporatedebt for companies
downgradedfrom investmentgrade to speculativegrade by Moody's Investor Services
(Moody's), so-called fallen angels. Based on a comprehensivedataset, they find a sharp
reductionin flexible sourcesof debt, such as bank revolvingcredit facilities,commercial
paper,andmedium-termnoteswhenfirmsare downgraded.Theyalso showempiricallythat
eventhoughthe availabilityof bank financingdeclinesand covenantson new issuestighten
after a downgrade,almostall companiesin their samplecontinueto rely on bank financing
afterthe downwade.Additionally,they find an increasein the use of privateplacementsand
convertibledebt, and that a substantialfractionof the samplecompaniesspreadtheir capital
structure after the downgradeas they simultaneouslyissue secured bank debt with tight
covenants and subordinatednon-bank debt. The findings of Rauh and Sufi (2007) are
consistentwith theoreticalmodelsin whichthe compositionand priorityof debt claimsare
structuredto encouragebankmonitoring,suchas Park(2000).
HoustonandJames(1996)examinedeterminantsof the mix of privateand publicdebtusing
a detaileddataset on the debt structureof 250 listed companiesfrom 1980 to 1990.The
paper finds that so-calledinformationmonopoliesassociatedwith borrowingfrom a single
bank lenderlimitthe use of bankdebt, especiallyfor companieswith largegowth prospects.
Their findings also postulate that loans from several banks or borrowing in public debt
markets can mitigate these informationproblems. However, the threshold level of the
informationmonopolyat whicha firmchoosesmultipleborrowingrelationshipsis lower for
largerfirms,becausethe cost of establishingmultipleborrowingrelationshipsis likelyto be
considerablylessthan for smallprivatelyheld firms.
Lasfer(1999)investigatedthe debt structureof UK firms, and demonstratedthat corporate
debt type, maturity and priority structures, and the determinants of these, are not
homogenousacross companies of various size. Lasfer (1999) found that smaller firms
generallyutilizemore leasing,bank loans and overdrafts,while larger companiesuse bond
loans,convertibleand subordinatedloansto a largerextent.Additionally,smallerfirmswere
more reliable on secured debt compared to large companies which generally issued
unsecured and subordinatedsecurities. Lasfer (1999) also found a positive correlation
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between firm size and maturity in his sample, because larger companies used a substantially
higher fraction of long-term debt than smaller firms.
Rauh and Sufi (2010) highlight the importance of recognizing debt heterogeneity in capital-
structure studies. Using an extensive dataset comprising the debt structure of public firms in
the U.S., they demonstrate that treating debt as homogenous ignore a substantial capital
structure variation. They find that high-credit quality firms rely almost solely on senior
unsecured debt and equity as a source of financing. Additionally, they find that firms with a
low credit quality in terms of credit rating use a more diversified debt structure when
speaking of seniority. They show that such firms simultaneously issue subordinated bonds
with loose covenants and bank debt with strict covenants.
2.3 Our study compared to previousstudies
As previously mentioned the majority of studies done examining capital structure treat debt
as homogenous. Now that several studies have illustrated the importance of considering
variations in debt structure, more research has been conducted in this field.
The vast majority of this research is done addressing the U.S. These studies typically seek to
explain empirical observations, for instance that smaller firms almost exclusively rely on
bank debt while larger companies typically use market debt. These studies are generally
related to a few aspects regarding debt composition, and are not intended to provide an
exhaustive explanation of what determines the debt structure a company chooses.
Lasfer (1999), Barclay and Smith (1995) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) examines the
relationship between different types of debt and key measures that define a company to
attempt to grasp the underlying context determining how companies choose a particular debt
structure over another. If they manage to do so will be up to others to determine, however,
there are few studies as comprehensive and overarching that seek to map the different
relationship characteristics of various debt types.
To our knowledge, no previous studies have thoroughly investigated corporate debt structure
in the Nordic countries. Our study is to some extent motivated by the approach of Lasfer
(1999), Barclay and Smith (1995) and Rauh and Sufi (2010), but instead of investigating
total capital structure, we limit our scope to focus on debt composition.
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Through this study, we seek to determine a set of firm specific, measurable variables
determining debt structure for Nordic companies. Our focus will be on different types of
debt and seniority. A detailed assessment of the determinants of maturity of corporate
liabilities is beyond the scope of this study.
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3. Data
In this section the data sample and the data gathering process used in the study are described.
The data collecting in this study has been a two-step process. First we had to identify Nordic
companies with a long-term credit rating from Moody's before 2012. Second we gathered
data on these companies' outstanding debt each year from 2001 through 2011.
3.1 Identifyingcompanies
Several restrictions have been applied to refine and make an appropriate framework for the
study and construct a sample of suitable companies to conduct the research on.
We have not considered financial firms such as banks and insurance companies in our
sample as their leverage are strongly influenced by investor insurance schemes such as
deposit insurance. In addition, their liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued
by nonfinancial firms (Rajan & Zingales, 1995).
The initial idea was to investigate the debt structure of Norwegian companies, but this
approach would have resulted in a narrow amount of observations. Consequently, the
geogaphical scope was extended to include all rated companies in the Nordic countries. To
avoid the survivorship biasl, the sample includes companies that have ceased to exist
sometime in the sample period, either due to an acquisition or a bankruptcy (Lasfer, 1999).
A joint capability of all the companies in the sample is that they have been rated sometime in
2011 or earlier. Theoretical research has highlighted that credit quality is a primary source of
variation driving corporate debt structure (Diamond, 1991a and Bolton & Freixas, 2000).
Hence, we wanted to examine this relationship for our sample companies. Additionally, our
empirical analysis needs a summary measure of credit quality, and to ensure uniformity and
transparency in our study we have used issuer credit ratings as a joint capability in our
sample.
1 Thesurvivorshipbiasrefersto theresultsof somestudiesto be skewedbecauseonlycompanieswhichwere
successfulenoughto surviveuntiltheendof theperiodare included(Brownet al., 1992)
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There are three large, international credit rating agencies (CRAs)2. All of these have issued
credit ratings for Nordic companies, but only Moody's has their ratings publicly available
through an academic subscription on their website. Hence, we have relied on the ratings
from Moody's in this study (See appendix 8.1 for rating symbols). As emphasized by Rauh
and Suft (2010), the downgrades of Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P) are highly
correlated, so we do not find it necessary to include additional ratings from S&P.
By examining the rating activity of Moody's (Moody's, 2012a) prior to 2012, a sample of all
non-financial Nordic firms with an issuer credit rating sometime before 2012 has been
gathered. Issuer credit ratings are not specific to any single debt issue made by a company
(Rauh & Sufi, 2010). When assessing an issuer, credit rating agencies evaluate the ability
and willingness of the issuer to repay the principal in correspondence with the agreed terms
(Standard & Poor's, 2011). The rating of a specific issue is based on the creditworthiness of
the issuer, but do also include an analysis of the issue itself. This analysis typically include
an assessment of the terms and conditions of the issue, the relative seniority of the issue
compared to other issues made by the company and the existence of external support or
enhancement such as guarantees, collateral and insurance. Some of the relevant companies
do not have an issuer credit rating. For these firms we have used proxies for issuer rating by
assessing the ratings of long-term senior unsecured bonds. This approach constituted a
sample of 74 companies.
To do an appropriate assessment of corporate debt structure for the relevant firms, a drastic
cut in the sample size was required. The reduction in the number of observations had to be
conducted due to the insufficient availability of information on debt structure for many of the
companies. Some companies are so sparse with information on their outstanding debt, that
they have been deemed inappropriate in the final sample because an evaluation of their debt
structure would have been highly inaccurate. An assessment of their debt structure is close to
impossible given the sources of information that we can access, as a rigorous analysis of
their debt would require insider information. Other companies do not exist anymore, either
due to bankruptcy or because they have been acquired. Consequently, some of these do have
very limited available financial and other information.
2 Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Service and Fitch Ratings are the three major, international credit rating
agencies (Dittrich, 2007)
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A few companieshave such a complexdebt structurewith so manydebt issuesof various
prioritiesand maturity,that they have been omittedpursuantto a cost-benefitassessment.
All in all, we haverequiredthat enoughinformationis availableto determinethebookvalue
of the differentdebt types to include a companyin the sample(Barclay& Smith, 1995).
Includingthese companiesin our samplewouldhave addeda largeamountof unnecessary
uncertaintyto the data set, and could have contributedto flawed conclusionsregarding
corporatedebt structure.An overviewof the companiesthat this appliesfor and the reason
for excludingthemis presentedin table21 in appendix8.2
3.2 Final sample of companies
By omitting the firms in table 21 in appendix 8.2, we achieved a final sample of 38
companies.An overviewof these companiesand the accompanyingtype of credit rating
used, arrangedby country,is presentedin table20 in appendix8.2.Thesecompaniesare all
Nordic non-financialfirms with a long-termcredit rating sometimebefore 2012, with an
assessabledebtstructurein accordancewithavailablesourcesof information.
A sampleof 38 companiesis somewhatlimited,and to compensate,datafrom2001to 2011
is includedfor eachcompanyas far as possible.Obviously,not all companieshaveavailable
figures for all 11 years. Some of them were foundedlater than 2001, or ceasedto exist
before 2011. We restrict the samplinguniverse to firm observationsin 2001 and later
becauseof limitedavailableinformationon debtstructurein previousyears.Thisrefinement
significantlycontributedto loweringthe costof the datagatheringprocesson debtdescribed
in section3.3.The finalsamplethen consistsof 370 firm-yearobservations.Althoughevery
firmin the samplehavehad an issuercreditratingat somepointbefore2012,thereare some
firm-year observationswhere the firm does not have a credit rating. Additionally,two
companiesdo not have a rating in the samplingperiod,but theyhavebeen includedto not
limitthe sample.
3.3 Data gathering process on debt structure
For each of the 38 companiesin our samplewe have constructeda debtbalancesheet for
everyyear with observationsfrom2001to 2011.All in all, a simultaneousassessmentof a
comprehensiveamountof informationanddatahas beenconductedin orderto determinethe
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characteristicsof the sample companies' debt structureas accurate as possible. The data
gatheringprocessis extensiveand time consuming,as companiesare sparsewith disclosing
detailson theiroutstandingdebtin their annualreports.
To map corporatedebt structurefor rated companiesin the Nordiccountries,we haverelied
on fourmain sources. This constitutesthe samplefirms' annualreportsand threedatabases;
ThomsonReutersSDC Platinum(SDC Platinum),ThomsonReutersDealScan(DealScan)
and Thomson Reuters One (Thomson One). In addition, we have used supplementary
sourcessuchas stockexchangesnewsdatabasesand othersourcessuchas loanprospectuses
and/orotherfinancialreportsandpresentations.
Our primary source of informationhas been the individual sample companies' annual
reports. It is important to note that the companies in the sample differ in their use of
reportingstandards,as somehave appliedIFRS3,whileothersare relyingon U.S. GAAP4or
nationalreportingstandards.Thismay also varybetweenyears for the same companies.As
the U.S. GAAPdefinitionsof what qualifiesas or requirestreatmentas a financialliability
are narrowerthanthe IFRSdefinitions(PwC,2012),the differencesin accountingstandards
are importantto understand.We have adjustedfor thesedifferencesby treatingall variables
and debt items consistently, and therefore we are of the opinion that differences in
accountingstandardswillhavenegligibleimplicationsfor the qualityof our data.
Onthe basisof thesereports,it is fairlystraightforwardto recognizethe total levelof interest
bearing debt for each companyeach year in the sampleperiod. The challengeis to fully
comprehendwhatsecuritiesthe interestbearingdebt actuallyconsistsof. Financialfootnotes
typicallyelaborateon the debt structureto some extentby providingsome informationon
the propertiesof the companies'outstandingdebt. Nevertheless,this informationis general
and almostexclusivelyinsufficientor incompletein orderto ascertainthe specificdetails in
terms of debt type,priorityand maturity.Maturityis beyondthe scopein our testing,but it
has to be assessedin order to identifythe differentissuesTo some extent, somecompanies
use descriptiveterminologysuch as "Floatingrate long-termbank loan, due 2010" in the
IFRS is short for the InternationalFinancialReportingStandards,a standarddevelopedto encotnpassthe
Mcreasinginterconnectionof internationalfmancialmarkets(Hoogervorst,2012)
4 U.S.GAAPis shortforUnitedStatesGeneralAcceptedAccountingPoliciesand is a frameworkof guidelines
for fmancialaccounting(FederalAccountingStandardsAdvisoryBoard,2012)
20
financialnotes to describecertainissues,but this revealsnothingaboutthe seniorityof the
issue or if this is a revolvingcredit facilityor a term loan. More general,the companies
typicallypool severalissuesunderbroaderreportedcategoriessuchas "Loansfromfinancial
institution",which makes it impossibleto understandthe details that distinguishdifferent
issues from one anotherand comprehendwhat the debt structureconsistsof. In some cases
evenless describingcategorization,suchas "Otherdebt", is applied.Whenthis terminology
is used to explain40-50%of the interestbearingdebt of a company,it is clear that solely
studyingannualreportsnot willyieldanydeeperunderstandingof corporatedebtstructure.
To be able to determinesomethingmore specificaboutthe debt structureof the companies
in our sample, we had to rely on additional sources of informationin most cases. By
consulting SDC Platinum, Thomson One and DealScan, we gained access to a
comprehensiveorigination-baseddataset comprisinghistoricaldebt issues. We have used
SDCPlatinumand ThomsonOneto identifyprivateplacementsand publicdebt issues,and
DealScan for syndicated and sole-lenderbank loans. These databases have some less
intuitive features and they require an effort from the user, but in return, they provide
indispensableinformationto identifynewdebtissues.
SDC Platinum is a database developedby Thomson Reuters, and is one of the most
comprehensiveand historicallyextensive informationsources on new issues. This is a
databasewithinformationon newissues,mergersand acquisitions,syndicatedloans,private
equity,poison pills and more. The databaseprovidesdetailson the characteristicsof debt
issues,andis availableto studentsat theNorwegianSchoolof Economics(NHH).
ThomsonReutershas also developedDealScan,a databasewith extensiveand reliabledeal
information on terms and conditionsof the global commercialloan market. DealScan
containsover200,000loan andbond transactionsfromaroundthe globe(HarvardBusiness
School,2012).We mainlyusedthis datasourceto complementSDCPlatinum,as it in some
casesincludea morethoroughdescriptionon loantermsandinformationonrefinancing.
In additionwe have accessedthe ThomsonReutersOne programonline.This programis
widely used by investment bankers, private equity and venture capital practitioners,
consultantsand lawyers(ThomsonReuters,2012). The programfeaturesreal-timemarket
quotes,estimates,financialfundamentals,press releases,deal and transactiondata,research
21
from Thomson Financial, and most importantly in this case; an historical overview over
issued bonds with extensive deal information.
For some companies, we had to go as far back as to the 1980s to locate the necessary debt
issues. Initially, we focused on SDC Platinum as our main external issue database. Soon, it
became clear that this database not is exhaustive, as it is sometimes lacking certain
characteristics associated with an issue. Consequently, we had to use the databases
interchangeably. Typically, a bond issue can be shown in SDC Platinum without any
information on any public listing, while Thomson One will state that it is listed. Another
issue is evident when the databases are contradicting one other. An issue may be classified as
a private bond issue in one of the databases, and a medium term note in another. This
problem has been present with regards to several issues, making it difficult to assess which
database that is providing the correct information. In addition, some issues are not mentioned
in either of the programs, or they are lacking information which makes them unidentifiable.
When the different databases provide insufficient or conflicting information, we have
accompanied them with other sources of information. This has mainly been prospectuses on
bond and loan issues and other financial reports and presentations such as interim fmancials,
capital markets day presentations and debt information on corporate websites. Prospectuses
commonly run over a substantial amount of pages, and for publicly traded issues they are
often found on the respective stock exchange's website by searching for the particular
issue' s ISIN5. However, they are not always easy to find. When located, however, they
provide exact and reliable information on the features of a debt issue. Additionally, the stock
exchanges also have news databases, such as Oslo Stock Exchange's NewsWeb (Oslo Børs,
2012), in which details on new debt issues often is included.
By applying this comprehensive approach, we have classified the relevant debt issues for the
companies included in our sample. However, to be able to say something sensible about the
composition of outstanding debt for each company each year, we need to understand the
historical amortization, maturity and refinancing of each issue.
5 ISINis short for InternationalSecuritiesIdentificationNumberwhichservesto uniformlyidentifya security
(InternationalSecuritiesIdentificationNumbersOrganisation,2012)
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Somecompaniesencloseinformationwithsufficientdetailin the financialfootnotesin order
to allocate planned amortizationand maturity of outstandingdebt to a specific issue.
However, this information is commonlystated on an aggregatedlevel, and it is often
problematicto allocateinstalmentsto a certainissue.Againadditionalinformationis needed
to fully grasp the dynamicsof the debt composition.All of the three databasesapplied
includeinformationon maturityof the issues,and SDCPlatinumand DealScanoftenstate
whether the purpose of an issue is refinancing. In addition, company announcements
publishedon NewsWeband similarnewsdatabasesfor otherstockexchangesoftenrevealif
the purposeof an issueis refinancingof existingdebt.Bymatchingthis informationwiththe
repaymentprofile statedin the individualdebt issue's prospectusand the amortizationplan
in the financial footnotes,we were able to grasp the retirementsand renegotiationsof a
significantfractionofthe samplefirms' outstandingdebt.
The comprehensiveprocess outlined above made us able to create an originationdebt
balancesheet for each companyin the sample,i.e. the debt compositionof the companyin
the firstyear includedin the database.By relyingon the data sourcesmentioned,we mapped
the new debt issues for each companyduringthe 11 year period. Furthermore,we had to
track the maturityprofileand refinancingof theseissues,and alsohowa company'sinterest
bearingdebt was affectedby M&A activity,divestmentsand other corporateactions.This
yieldeda debtcompositionbalancesheetfor eachcompanyeachyearwithobservations.
3.4 Categorization of debt issues
In financialterms, interestbearingdebtdescribesa situationwherethe lenderchargesa fee
for the right to borrowmoney.Interestbearingdebt can thus take severaldifferentforms.
Themaincategoriesarebondsandbankloans.The debtcan havedifferenttypesof seniority
and may be availableto the public throughan exchangelisting.We have in the following
presenteddefinitionson typesof debt thatwe will use to classifydifferenttypesof debt into
categories.
3.4.1 Bonds
Bondsare in its simplestform a contractbetweentwo partieswhereone or more creditors
lend an amountto a borrowerat the issue date and receiveintereston pre-specifieddates
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(Mjøs, 2012). Bonds can, however, have several different characteristics,often rather
overlapping.Wehavepresentedthe definitionsof the maintypesof bondsin the following.
Regular/straight bonds are instrumentsthat share several similaritieswith syndicatedterm
loans,onlywithoutinstalments.A bond is issuedat the settlementdate and paidback to the
bondholdersat maturity.The borrowerreceives a principal equal to the face value of the
bond at the issue date and pay coupons(interest)whichis measuredas a percentageof the
principalamount (Fabozzi,2005). The regular/straightbonds can either have a fixed or a
floatingcouponrate.
Zero-coupon bonds are identicalto regularbonds with the exceptionthat the borrowerdoes
not pay a coupon rate to the bondholders.The investors in zero-couponbonds typically
receive interestbecausethe bond is issued at a heavy discountto the face value (Fabozzi,
2005).
Medium-term notes (MTN)are bonds originallycreatedto fill the gap between short term
borrowings(such as commercialpapers) and long-termregularbonds. When corporations
engagein medium-termnote progams a base prospectusfor future issues is created.This
prospectusstates a maximumamount that the corporationmight borrow under the given
program.Due to the base prospectuseach individualissue meets lower requirementsfor
documentationthan a regularbond. MTNs are typicallyunsecureddebt issues with fixed-
couponrates carryingan investment-graderating (Fabozzi,2005), however, issues within
one programmighthave differentnominalyield,maturity,coupons,principalcurrencyetc.
dependingon issuersneed or marketdemand.Bookrunningis normallyperformedunder a
best-effortunderwritingbasis (Fabozzi,2005).
Shelf debt is a typeof mediumtermnote wherethe corporationis allowedto registera base
prospectusand wherethe corporationdoesnot have to prepare separateprospectusfor each
offering.
Commercial paper is a type of short-term,unsecuredborrowingissued at a discountwhere
the borrowernormallydoes not pay any interest. A commercialpaper normallymatures
within 270 days as this exempts the paper for SEC registrationin the Americanmarket
(Fabozzi,2005).
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Convertible debt is similarto regularbonds,but in additionto the "regularbond"the holder
has the right to call the bonds, thus convertingparts or the entire principalto equityat a
conversionpriceunderpre specifiedconditions(Berk& DeMarzo,2011).
Public bond issuescanbe eitherone of the abovementionedbonds.In orderfor a bondto be
definedas publicit has to be availableto the publicthroughan exchangelisting.Opposedto
publicbondsareprivate bonds. Thesebondscanbe offeredto investorsin severalways,but
the commondenominatoris that the bonds are not listed at any exchangeafter the issue
(Mjøs,2012).
3.4.2 Bank loans
Bank loans are either providedby one bank on a bilateral basis, or as syndicatewhere
several banks go together in order to raise money to lend to the borrower.Bank loans
normallytakeone of twoforms;termloanor revolvingcredit.
Term loans are similar to regular bonds, the principal is issued at face value, and the
borrowerpays a couponrate on a predefined,either fixed or floating,rate. As opposedto
regularbondsthe bankdebt is normallyamortizedduringthematurityperiod.
Revolving credit facilities are credit facilitieswhere corporationscan draw funds until a
certainlimitwheneverit suitsthe borrower.Interestsarea resultof the sizeof the fundsand
at what the time the fundsare repaid.In additionthe borrowersnormallypay a low interest
in orderto haveaccessto the facility.
3.4.3 Mezzanine capital
Somefinancialinstrumentshaveboth debt and equitycharacteristics.This includesnormal
convertibledebtwhichis definedabove.Convertibledebtwill typicallybe presentedas debt
in a company'sbalance sheet. However,there are hybrid capitalthat occasionallywill be
presentedas equity.Mezzaninecapital refers to subordinateddebt or preferredsharesthat
have a claim on the firm's asset only senior to commonshares.Preferredshares are not
entitledto a normaldividend,but an annualinterest(Fabozzi,2005).A firmis not obligedto
pay this interestas long as the firm doesnot pay dividendto the other shareholder.In such
casesthe firmwill haveto pay the holderof the preferredsharedthe accruedinterestbefore
dividendscanbe granted.
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3.4.4 Debt seniority
Capital raised by a firm has claims on a firrn's future cash flow. However, different type of
capital has different risk profiles. A firm is contractual to pay accrued interest and repay debt
when it matures as opposed to equity which can be considered as a residual claim on a firm's
assets and cash flow. Debt can also be divided into different layers with different seniority.
Senior secured debt is the most senior type of debt. A senior secured debt issue has specific
assets, collateralized to the claim. For holding companies, these assets can be securities
owned in other companies. In a default situation the specified collateral will be liquidated or
transferred to the creditor to cover the claims. If an issue is collateralized directly with a
tangible asset, as for instance real property and not securities, it is called a mortgage
(Fabozzi, 2005). A mortgage bond grants the bondholder a first-mortgage lien on the
pledged assets. A lien is a legal right to sell mortgaged property to satisfy unpaid obligations
to bondholders (Fabozzi, 2005).
Senior unsecured debt is not collateralized by any specific asset but is prioritized above the
subordinated debt, which is only senior to equity (Fabozzi, 2005).
3.4.5 Final categorization
Based on the presentation of various types of debt above, the descriptions in the companies'
financial footnotes and the information in the databases we have assessed presented in
section 3.3, we have classified each debt issue for the 38 sample companies in seven broader
categories. This pooling of similar issues is conducted based on the method presented by
Rauh and Sufi (2010), with refinements for Nordic debt characteristics, in order not to make
the data sample too complex for conducting testing and regressions. The categories are:
Bank debt
Bank debt includes two main categories, namely revolving credit facilities and term
loans. Each of these broad categories is divided in secured, senior unsecured and
subordinated issues.
Bonds
Bonds constitute public and private placement bond issues, as well as revenue bonds.
Each of these three main categories is further divided by seniority, and we distinguish
between secured, senior unsecured and subordinated bonds.
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Program debt
Program debt consists of commercial paper, medium term notes and shelf-registered
debt. MTNs are divided between public and private issues, and further separated on
seniority similar to bonds and bank loans.
Mortgage debt
Mortgage debt is secured by definition and no further classification has been done.
Convertible debt
Mezzanine debt
Convertible debt is further separated by seniority in senior unsecured and
subordinated issues.
Other debt
Other debt is divided between acquisition notes, capitalized leases, and loans from
corporations. In addition a subcategory labelled unclassified is included.
This classification of debt has been done based on what we believe is most appropriate when
assessing the types of debt we have come across in the process of gathering data, and based
on previous studies and literature (Mjøs, 2012 and Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Due to the properties
of the different debt types, some categorizations are self-evident. Bank debt normally takes
one of two forms, so the separation of revolving credit facilities and term loans is necessary
to say something more specific on the structure of bank debt.
Regular corporate bonds, both public and private, have been pooled in the same category.
Additionally, some companies had outstanding revenue bonds during the sample period
which have been included in the category. Revenue bonds are a type of security typically
issued for project or enterprise financing, in which the borrowers pledge to the bondholder
the generated revenues from the financed operations (Fabozzi, 2005).
Medium-term notes, commercial paper and shelf registered debt have been included under a
broader category labelled Program debt. These debt types differ from regular corporate
bonds in the way they are initially distributed to investors and reported to the authorities.
Corporate bonds are typically underwritten by investment bankers, while MTNs and shelf-
registered debt are mainly offered on a best-effort6 basis. Additionally, MTNs are usually
6 Whenan investmentbankunderwritesthe issue,theyguaranteeforthe issueamount.A best-effortbasisrefers
to the investmentbanknottakinganyrisk on not fillingthe issue(Berk&DeMarzo,2011)
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sold in smaller amounts relatively continuously, while regular bonds are sold in large,
discrete offerings (Fabozzi, 2005). Commercial paper can be seen as a short-term version of
MTNs, and consequently we find it suitable to pool these different types of fixed income
securities.
Mortgage debt is included as an individual category. In this category we have included bank
and bond loans with a first-mortgage lien on physical assets. We did not include these bank
issues under for instance the bank debt category, because mortgage debt does not share the
same necessity for monitoring as regular secured bank debt does. This is because a mortgage
has pledged physical assets, while a secured bank loan can have security in securities owned
in subsidiaries or other financial assets. In order to not undermine this property regarding
mortgage debt, we included these issues in a separate category.
We have separated convertible and mezzanine debt. All straight bonds including a warrant to
convert a claim in to equity are considered as convertible debt issues (Berk & DeMarzo,
2011). The category labelled mezzanine debt includes hybrid instruments with payment in
kind containing features of both debt and equity, lying somewhere between debt and
common equity. The rationale for distinguishing between these two is the property of
mezzanine to enhance liquidity.
Remaining issues have been pooled in a category labelled other debt. This includes claims
that do not fit well under any of the other categories, as for example acquisition notes,
capitalized leases, and loans from other corporations. Capitalized leases is viewed as an
acquisition for accounting purposes, and the present value of the future lease payments is
listed as a liability (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). This category also includes unclassified issues,
i.e. issues that cannot be justified to classify given the available information.
Regarding seniority, an issue has been declared secured if the firm states that the issue is
collateralized by some of the firm' s assets, or if the issue is a mortgage bond. An issue has
been considered subordinated if the description of the issue includes "subordinated". An
issue that does not fall in to either of the two mentioned categories is considered as senior
unsecured. This is a fairly coarse classification, but it is supported as an influential
determinant of cash-flow and control rights in a bankruptcy process by both Barclay and
Smith (1995) and Baird and Rasmussen (2006).
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3.5 Financialaccountingdata and proxyvariables
In order to investigate the objectives stipulated in section 2.3, we have examined a number
of proxy variables to investigate the relationship between firm specific measures and debt
structure. We have included the variables we believe to have a significant effect on the
choice of debt structure, and have chosen these variables based on our preliminary
assessments and findings of previous studies. In this section, these variables are presented.
Our main source of financial accounting data has been the annual reports of the companies in
our final sample.
Previous studies have emphasized firm size as an important measure when speaking of
corporate debt structure. Theoretical research has proposed several methods of
approximating firm size. We have derived a proxy for firm size by calculating the natural
logarithm of sales in the income statement for each firm. This approach is supported by Rauh
and Sufi (2010), while Barclay and Smith (1995) suggest using the logarithm of total assets.
Lasfer (1999) uses market capitalization as a proxy, but emphasizes, as do Barclay and
Smith (1995), that using sales as an alternative proxy is not significantly altering the results.
We have also included profitability as a variable, as previous research has elucidated this as
an important variable for leverage. Profitability is integal part of a company's probability of
default (Mjøs, 2012). Companies that are unprofitable have a higher bankruptcy risk than
profitable companies because they continuously will be dependent on providing extemal
funding to fund the deficits. Once investors stop providing equity to the company and if it
not tums profitable, inevitability the company will default on its debt at some point. Rating
and profitability should thus prove to have some of the same characteristics on debt
utilization. However, rating also includes other aspects, such as loss given default, and rating
and profitability is thus not expected to yield the same results. Fama and French (2002)
recognized that more profitable firms are less levered, and also suggested EBIT to end-of-
year total assets as a proxy for expected profitability of assets in place. Other studies
(Barclay & Smith, 1995 and Rauh & Sufi, 2010) suggest using the companies' level of
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total sales. We have used the latter
approximation variable to assess profitability.
We have also assessed credit rating to be an important variable, and included rating from
Moody's as a summary measure of credit quality and the quality of the company. Theoretical
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research has established credit rating as one of the main variables driving debt structure
(Diamond, 1991a and Bolton & Freixas, 2000), and is consequently adequate to include.
Tangibility has also been examined, as we assess this figure to be relevant for debt structure,
and a proxy for debt capacity due to its opportunity to be used as collateral for mortgages or
other secured loans (Titman & Wessels, 1988). We have used intangible assets ratio7, which
will be negatively related to collateral value. Information on intangible assets can easily be
obtained from companies' annual reports. Previous research has recognized a positive
relationship between tangibility and leverage (Rauh & Sufi, 2010) and that firms with more
tangible assets, easily valued are expected to have lower costs of financial distress (Pulvino,
1998). Consequently, we believe tangibility to be relevant for Nordic debt structure.
Growth prospects have also been established as an important parameter affecting the choice
of priority structure of debt (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Fama and French (2002) recognized
that firms with more investment opportunities have less market leverage. Market-to-book is
well established as a proxy for growth potential through future investments, and to assess the
market-to-book ratio for our sample finns, we have relied on Thomson One. This progam
includes figures on historical market capitalization for listed companies. As not all of our
companies are public, some firms in the sample do not have a market-to-book ratio.
We have also included the NACE8-codes of each company in order to say something about
the relationship between debt structure and the specific industry the company operates
within. NACE is the European standard classification of productive economic activities
(Eurostat, 2012). NACE consists of a hierarchical structure, with the first level consisting of
21 headings identified by an alphabetical code describing overall industry (European
Commission, 2012). The hierarchical structure consists of four levels, but we have only
assessed the first level in our analyses for regression purposes in order to allow companies to
pool in the same category. The NACE codes where gathered from the websites of the
European Commission (European Commission, 2012), and a list of the classification for the
sample companies is listed in appendix 8.3. The companies with much diversified operations
7 Wehavedefmedintangibleassetratioas totalintangibleassetsdividedby totalcapital.
8 NACE is a French acronym,which translatedto Englishis short for GeneralIndustrialClassificationof
EconomicActivitieswithintheEuropeanCommunities(Eurostat,2012).
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have not been classified, as they can be directly associated with two or more main
categories.
According to the trade-off theory, tax should encourage companies to borrow because of the
tax shields (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). However, the positive relationship between
taxation and debt is not expected for all types of debt, as for example leasing9 should be
negatively correlated to a company's tax liability (Lasfer, 1999). According to this, an
examination of the relationship between tax and debt structure for Nordic countries could be
interesting. However, typical proxies for the effective marginal tax rate of companies also
seem to include other firm characteristics such as investment opportunities or likelihood of
financial distress (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Providing an accurate test of this will require
proxies that are better in isolating companies' tax status. Consequently, we have not assessed
tax as a variable in our models as we have considered the process of determining the exact
level of tax shields to yield an insufficiently accurate result.
9 Leasingis seniorto secured,seniorunsecuredandsubordinateddebt.(Barclay& Smith,1995)
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4. Findings and analysis
In this section we will present our findings, and discuss these findings in the light of
previous empirical studies and established corporate finance theory. The first part of this
section contains summary statistics which presents an overview of the data sample we have
collected. The second part of this section is our main section and introduces a number of
univariate and multivariate tests and regression models that seek to examine which
measurable, firm specific variables that determine corporate debt structure. The third part of
this section is an assessment on whether companies tend to alter their debt structure even if
certain firm specific variables stay constant. The last part of this section seeks to examine if
there are any significant change to debt structure when firms get downgyraded from
investment grade to speculative grade by the credit rating agency, Moody's.
4.1 Summarystatistics
Our data consists of eleven years of observation for 38 firms, totalling 370 observations,
coming from five different countries. Table 1 panel A presents an overall summary of debt
structure. The average represents the average utilization between 2001 and 2011. The
"annual standard deviation" is the standard deviation amongst the annual averages, whereas
"total standard deviation" is the standard deviation amongst all of the 370 observations.
Panel B presents what the average level of firm variables have been between 2001 and 2011.
Panel C, on the other hand, presents the average debt utilization divided by which country
the observation originates from.
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TABLE 1 - UTILIZATION OF DIFFERENT DEBT CLASSES
Panel A presents how Nordic rated companies on average utilize different debt classes inpercentage
of total interest bearing debt. The annual standard deviation, max and min represent the standard
deviation, maximum and minimum values amongst the annual averages, whereas the total standard
deviation, max and min represent the standard deviation, maximum and minimum value amongst all of
our 370 observations. Panel B illustrates the average value of certain keyfirm variables, whereas
panel Cpresents average debt utilization divided by countty. Thefigures are based on 370
observations, except Rating and Market/Book which are based on 272 and 246, respectively.
Pane1 A - Overviewof average debt utilization


Annual Annual Annual Total Total Total Total
Debt Instruments Average St.dev Max Min Median St.dev Max Min
Bank loans 0.287 0.029 0.328 0.211 0.193 0.295 1.000 0.000
Bonds 0.202 0.040 0.269 0.151 0.086 0.250 0.975 0.000
Program 0.320 0.026 0.361 0.267 0.239 0.317 1.000 0.000
M ortgage 0.037 0.010 0.053 0.024 0.000 0.111 0.690 0.000
Convertible 0.014 0.007 0.028 0.004 0.000 0.065 0.662 0.000
M ezzanine 0.005 0.004 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.533 0.000
Other 0.136 0.014 0.177 0.121 0.077 0.155 0.815 0.000
Panel B - Average firm variables


Annual Annual Annual Total Total Total Total
Firm Variables Average St.dev M ax Min Median St.dev Max Min
EBIT/Sales 0.105 0.031 0.157 0.037 0.097 0.251 0.731 -3.732
Ln(Sales) 8.254 0.103 8.390 7.996 8.643 1.631 11.007 -1.895
Intangibility ratio 0.348 0.024 0.398 0.301 0.175 0.379 2.313 0.000
Rating 3.834 0.359 4.344 3.267 4.000 1.285 8.000 1.000
M arket/Book 2.813 0.990 5.296 1.926 1.900 4.717 54.900 0.000
Net leverageratio 0.225 0.073 0.349 0.095 0.368 0.580 1.281 -4.244
Gross leverageratio 0.629 0.020 0.674 0.599 0.633 0.149 1.110 0.048
Panel C - Debt utilization by country


( 1 ) ( 2 ) (3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) (7 )
Country Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
Denmark 0.497 0.077 0.214 0.090 0.000 0.038 0.085
Finland 0.228 0.295 0.311 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.165
Iceland 0.388 0.110 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158
Norway 0.235 0.329 0.296 0.029 0.021 0.000 0.089
Seweden 0.235 0.162 0.375 0.044 0.020 0.000 0.165
Table 1 indicatesthat certaindebt classesare moreutilizedthan others.This is as expected
as our categories,as explainedin section3.4,have been definedon the basis of debt class'
attributes.We havenot takenintoaccountthat the differentclassescontaina diverseamount
of sub categories.This leads some categoriesto cover more types of debt than others.A
differentclassificationwould,however,limit the interpretationof the data as the attributes
thenwouldhavevariedtoo muchwithineachclass.
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The most utilized debt categories are bank loans, bonds and program debt, with utilization
rates of 28.4%, 20.2% and 31.9%, respectively. These three categories make up most of
Nordic countries utilized debt instruments, and accounts for approximately 80% of all debt.
Mortgage, convertible and mezzanine debt are utilized in a much smaller extent, 3.7%, 1.4%
and 0.5%, respectively.
The standard deviations presented in panel A indicate that there are rather substantial
differences in corporate debt structure amongst Nordic rate companies. This is reflected by a
total standard deviation being approximately equal in size as the averages for bank loans,
bonds and program debt. The standard deviations are 29.5%, 25.0% and 31.8% respectively
compared to averages of 28.7%, 20.2% and 32.0%. Mortgage has a standard deviation of
11.1% compared to an average of 3.7%, convertible debt has a standard deviation of 6.6%
compared to an average 1.4%, mezzanine has a standard deviation of 4.1% compared to an
average of 0.5%, whereas other debt has a standard deviation of 15.5% compared to an
average of 13.6%.
The maximum and minimum values are divergent. Bank loans, bonds and program debt has
a maximum utilization of 100% or close to 100% (bonds having 97.5%), and 0.0% as
minimum. As showed in previous paper (Rauh & Sufi, 2010), these types of debt instrument
are normally a company's main credit lines. Mortgage, convertible and mezzanine have
lower maximum values. These are typically considered as complementary debt instruments,
and the maximum values are 69.0%, 62.2% and 53.3% respectively.
Panel B presents several average key ratio values for the years 2001 to 2011. There are large
discrepancies between the standard deviation amongst the different ratios. The profitability
has on average been 10.5% measured as EBIT/Sales. The standard deviation is, however,
more than twice the size of the average at 25.1%. The other end of the scale is gross leverage
ratio. Nordic rated companies has on average had 62.9% gross leverage ratio between 2001
and 2011, with a low standard deviation at 14.9%. As seen from the table, our sample firms
spread out over credit ratings Aaa to Cc, market to book values of 5.4 to 0.0 and intangibility
ratios of 231.3% to 0.0%. This indicates that our data sample is divers, and that it includes
the whole range of companies, from good performers to companies that perform poorly
Panel C presents the utilization averages divided by country. Iceland is the country utilizing
the highest fraction of bank debt, 38.8% of total debt. Norway is the country utilizing the
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highest fraction of bonds, 32.9% of total debt, whereas Sweden is the primary issuer of
program debt with a utilization rate at 37.5%. Convertibles are not utilized amongst Finish
rated companies, whereas mortgage is utilized in Finland and Iceland. Mezzanine is only
utilized amongst Danish rated companies. Panel C indicates that national characteristics
should prove to be having a significant influence on companies' debt structure.
Table 1 indicates that there is a certain portion of standard deviation between the
different annual averages. In order to examine how utilization of different debt
instruments have evolved between 2001 and 2011 we have computed a figure to
examine if there seems to be certain trends in debt structures amongst Nordic rated
companies. Figure 1 illustrates the development of the different debt fractions between
2001 and 2011. Bank loans were at the end of 2011 utilized less than in 2001 (with
utilization ratios at 30% and 31% respectively, however, the utilization ratio has
increased significantly from 2003 an onwards, where the fraction of utilized bonds was
all time low at 21% of total debt. The fraction of bond utilization grew from 22% to
27% utilization rate from 2001 to 2004. There have been a declining trend since, and the
fraction of utilized bonds is today 17% of total debt. Program debt has had the opposite
trend growing from a utilization ratio of 29% of total debt in 2001 to 36% of total debt
today. Mortgage debt increased from 3% utilization in 2002 to 5% in 2003, 2004 and
2005 before it fell back to 3%. Convertible utilization has been rather steady around 1%
and 2% utilization rate, peaking in 2009 at 3%. Mezzanine, on the other hand has been
insignificant all the years except 2006 to 2009.
Figure 1 indicates that there was a substantial change in debt structure from 2006 to
2010, with bank loans increasing substantially in utilization prior to the financial crises
in 2008. A possible explanation for this might be the increasingly popular phenomenon
of securitization, which in effect increases banks credit and gives companies access to
bank loans with low yield. From the figure, this situation seems to be somewhat
reversed after the finance crises, when program debt appears to have increased at the
expense of bank loans.
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FIGURE 1 —HISTORICALDEVELOPMENTOF DEBTUTILIZATION
Thefollowing figure illustrates how the utilization of different debt instruments have developed throughout our
observationperiod. The amounts are scaled by total debt.
The summerystatisticso far treats debt categoriesone by one. However,our data indicates
that companiestend to utilize more than one debt instrumentsimultaneously.1n order to
clearlygraspthis phenomenonwe have constructedtwo matrixesthat present the extent of
companiesmakinguse of anotherdebt instrumentif theyutilizemore than 10%of a certain
instrument.
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TABLE 2 - UTILIZATION OF MULTIPLE DEBT CLASSES
Thefollowing table presents how Nordic rated companies on average utilize different debt classes in
percentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A is a matrixpresenting how much of a certain debt
instrument a company, that utilize more than 10% of one of the debt instruments in the left column, on
average utilize. Figures inpanel A are calculated as percentage of total debt. Panel B indicates how
many companies, inpercentage, that utilizes more than 10% of a specific debt instrumentgiven, that
they utilize more than 10% of the debt instrument in the left column. Figures inpanel B, is measured
aspercentage of total companies that issue more than 10% of the debt instrument in the lefi side
column.
Panel A - Utilizationof multipledebtinstruments
Instruments
( 1 )
Bank
( 2 )
Bonds
( 3 )
Program
( 4 )
Mortgagv
( 5 )
Convertible
( 6 )
Mezzanine
( 7 )
Other
Bank >10% 1.000 0.496 0.492 0.119 0.045 0.029 0.361
Bonds >10% 0.676 1.000 0.520 0.067 0.017 0.000 0.402
Program >10% 0.543 0.421 1.000 0.027 0.032 0.027 0.489
Mortgage>10% 0.906 0.375 0.188 1.000 0.063 0.000 0.250
Convertible >10% 0.611 0.167 0.389 0.111 1.000 0.000 0.222
Mezzanine >10% 1.000 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.143
Other >10% 0.564 0.462 0.692 0.051 0.026 0.006 1.000
Public >10% 0.576 0.529 0.808 0.024 0.027 0.012 0.463
Panel B - Utilizationrateof debtinstrument.s,givensignificantly utilizationof a certaininstrument


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Instruments Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
Bank >10% 0.426 0.187 0.208 0.048 0.010 0.008 0.113
Bonds >10% 0.215 0.397 0.221 0.035 0.008 0.000 0.123
Program>10% 0.161 0.139 0.534 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.143
Mortgage>10% 0.383 0.091 0.051 0.352 0.007 0.000 0.116
Convertible >10% 0.373 0.071 0.188 0.037 0.260 0.000 0.071
Mezzanine >10% 0.316 0.000 0.349 0.027 0.000 0.277 0.032
Other >10% 0.172 0.176 0.358 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.273
Public >10% 0.312 0.204 0.281 0.040 0.015 0.006 0.143
Panel A illustrates how many companies that on average utilize a particular debt
instrument given that they utilize a fraction higher than 10% of another debt instrument.
This table illustrates the phenomenon that companies tend to make use of several debt
structures simultaneously. On average 49.8% of all the companies that utilize a higher
fraction than 10% of bank loans also utilize bonds, 49.4% utilize program debt, 11.9%
utilize mortgage debt, 4.5% utilize convertibles, 2.9% utilize Mezzanine debt, whereas
36.2% utilize other debt. Interesting aspects are that amongst companies utilizing
mortgage debt, over 90.6% also utilize bank loans, 60.1% of the companies utilizing
convertibles utilize bank loans, whereas 100% of the companies utilizing mezzanine
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also utilize bank loans, clearly indicating that mortgage, convertible and mezzanine debt
seldom are a company's main credit line.
Panel B reveals how much companies utilize of a certain debt instrument if they utilize
more than 10%. Thus companies that utilize a significant portion of bank debt
(significant implying more than 10%) utilize 42.3%. This implies that the company
utilizes more than 57.7% percentage of other debt instruments as well. On average
companies utilize 18.7% bonds, 20.9% program debt, 4.8% mortgage, 1.0% convertible
and 0.8% mezzanine simultaneously as the utilize more than 10% bank debt. None of
the defined debt instruments have utilization fractions higher than 53.5%, which is the
average utilization level of program debt amongst the companies that utilize more than
10% of this specific instrument. This leaves room to design corporate debt structure in
specific ways, depending on what situation the company finds itself in. This
demonstrates why it is interesting to examine what determines corporate debt structure
by itself and not just as a part of corporate capital structure, where debt often is treated
rather homogeneous (Rauh & Sufi, 2010).
A company's credit rating is thought to have a severe impact on corporate debt structure
(Rauh & Sufi, 2007), as a credit rating is supposed to reflect probability of default and
loss given default (Moody's, 2012b). Figure 1 and 2 presents how companies with
different corporate rating utilize debt on average. The debt is divided into four
categories, two representing the investment grade companies, and two representing the
speculative grade companies.
Figure 2 illustrate that equity is the main funding for all types of rated firms. The fraction
varies quite substantially, however. Poorly rated companies utilize more than 60% equity on
average. Mid-range companies utilize 34% on average, whereas the best rated firms utilize
47%. Whether a company is investment grade or not does not seems to influence the equity
level in particular as the leverage ratio is equal between the A/Baa rated group and the Ba/B
rated group. The only utilization rate that differ substantially between the two groups are
bank and progam debt, being 13% and 29% for A/Baa rated and 23% and 8% for Ba/B
rated, respectively.
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FIGURE 2 - CAPITAL STRUCTURE BY RATING
Figure 2 presents the crveragecapital structure of Nordic rated firms categorised by rating. The
numbers are measured in percentage of total capital, defined as interest bearing debt and equity
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FIGURE 3 —DEBT UTILIZATION BY RATING
Figure 3 presents the average fraction of debt utilization categorised by rating. The numbers are
measured inpercentage of total interest bearing debt.
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Figure 3, illustrates that speculative grade firms on average utilize higher fractions of
mortgage, convertible and mezzanine debt. These three debt categories thus look to be debt
classes that are mostly used as other instruments gets unavailable or to expensive due to
falling credit ratings, which is an assessment that supports the pecking order theory. Figure 3
also indicates that Aaa,Aa and A,Baa (investment giade companies) utilize an equal amount
of program debt. A,Baa companies, however, utilizes a higher portion of bank debt (19%
compared to 9% of total interest bearing debt debt), while Aaa,Aa firms utilizes a higher
portion of bonds (35% to 19% of interest bearing debt). The trend continues if we look at
Ba/B rated firms. They utilize the highest fraction of bank debt of all the four categories,
equalling 35% of total debt. Ba/B companies compensate by having a low utilization of
program debt, which is totalling 11% of total debt. This is in some extent in line with Rauh
and Sufi's (2010) findings. They, however, did not derive a negative relationship between
credit quality and bank loan utilization, but between profitability and bank loan utilization
which is an important factor in credit rating, as a rating indicates a finns probability of
default (in addition to loss given default) (Moody's, 2012b). The Caa/Ca rated firms main
debt funding source is bonds, equalling 38%, whereas they have the highest utilization rate
of convertible, totalling 11% of total debt.
4.1.1 Detailed debt split
When assessing whether different securities are secured, senior unsecured or subordinated
and public or private, we divided the debt categories into several sub categories. Table 3
presents our findings in a more detailed manner than in table 1.
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TABLE 3 - COMPOSITIONAND PRIORITYOF TOTALDEBT
Thefollowing tablepresents on a detailed level, how rated Nordicfirms compose their debt structure.
The amounts are inpercentage of total interest bearing debt.
Detaileddebtutilizationsplit
Parameters Average
Annual
St.dev
Total
St.dev
Total
Max
Total
Min
BankLoans 0.284 0.034 0.293 1.000 0.000
Revolving 0.106 0.061 0.211 1.000 0.000
TermLoan 0.141 0.043 0.232 1.000 0.000
Unclassified 0.037 0.002 0.128 0.820 0.000
Bonds 0.202 0.040 0.250 0.975 0.000
RegularBond 0.197 0.069 0.251 0.975 0.000
RevenueBond 0.002 0.004 0.029 0.526 0.000
Unclassified 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.252 0.000
ProgramDebt 0.319 0.028 0.318 1.000 0.000
CommercialPaper 0.031 0.011 0.080 0.735 0.000
Medium-TermNote 0.281 0.035 0.306 1.000 0.000
Shelf-RegisteredDebt 0.002 0.003 0.019 0.220 0.000
Unclassified 0.005 0.003 0.025 0.267 0.000
MortgageDebt 0.037 0.010 0.112 0.690 0.000
Convertibles 0.014 0.007 0.065 0.662 0.000
MezzanineDebt 0.005 0.004 0.041 0.533 0.000
Other 0.140 0.018 0.165 0.815 0.000
AquistionNotes 0.008 0.004 0.045 0.596 0.000
CapitalLeases 0.030 0.004 0.095 0.809 0.000
Loansfromothers 0.004 0.002 0.029 0.254 0.000
Unclassified 0.097 0.020 0.145 0.810 0.000
Seniority




Secured 0.106 0.027 0.236 1.000 0.000
Seniorunsecured 0.699 0.037 0.297 1.000 0.000
Subordinated 0.032 0.013 0.096 0.533 0.000
Unclassified 0.153 0.025 0.193 0.842 0.000
Public/Private




Public 0.387 0.033 0.317 1.000 0.000
Private 0.618 0.027 0.317 1.000 0.000
As seen from table 3 bank loans are relativelyevenlyspreadbetweenrevolvingand term
loan.On averagecompaniesutilizationof revolvingdebt equal10.6%of totalleddebt.Term
loanutilizationis somewhathigherat 14.1%.Thehighmaximumobservationofunclassified
debt relates to a companythat carries only an almost insignificantlyportion of interest
bearingdebt,whichwe wereunableto classifyas term loan or revolvingcredit.Bondsand
progam debt is mainly focused around one particular subcategory.Out of a total bond
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utilization rate at 20.2%, the average firm utilize regular bonds equalling 19.7% of total debt.
Medium-term notes are the prominent type of program debt with a utilization rate of 28.1%
of total debt. Other debt is based mainly on capital leases and unclassified debt.
Table 3 indicates that Nordic rated companies prefer to issue senior unsecured debt. On
average 69.9% of a company's total debt is senior unsecured. 10.6% is secured debt and only
3.2% is subordinated. However, the maximum values show that there are companies relying
100% on just secured debt.
The bottom of table 3 present the spilt between public and private bonds. As shown in the
table, 38.7% of all utilized debt is public, whereas 61.8% are private. This skewed
distribution is mainly due to the fact that private debt includes all bank loans.
4.2 Regressionmodelingand univariatetesting
In order to detect if there is a relationship between certain firm variables and debt structure
we have used several types of multivariate regressions, univariate regression and testing.
We begin by presenting the results coming from our different tests and regression equations
before we discuss them in light of each other, other empirical research and corporate finance
theory at the end of this section. The first step is to present the basic relationship between
firm variables and debt categories through a univatiate test called Mann-Whitney. The
second step is to introduce linear regression models to describe the linear relationship
between firm variables and debt classes one by one. Finally we conduct multivariate
regression models including a variety of parameters in order to get a more comprehensive
view on the contexts between firm variables and debt structure.
4.2.1 Findings
1. Univariate test
Because we have several observations equalling zero for each debt class, and the fact that
utilization rates cannot take negative values, we recognise that our figures are not normally
distributed. In order to get an initial overview over the coherence between firm values and
different debt categories we have thus relied upon the non-parametrical Mann-Whitney test.
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The Mann-Whitney test (Keller, 2005) simply assess whether there are significant
differencesbetweentwo groups.We havethus categorisedeachobservationintoone of two
goups, either the high value group or the low value group based on each of our firm
variables.The non-parametricMann-Whitneydoesnot assumeanynormaldistribution,as it
simply asses the rank sum of two differentsamplegroups,and examineswhetherone is
significantlylarger than the other on the basis of a calculatedU-statistic.This test is also
knownas Wilcoxonsrank-sumtest andfollowsthe null andalternativehypothesis:
Ho:Thereare no differencesbetweentheranksumsof thehighandlowgroupgroups
HA:Therank sumsof the highgroupare differentfromthe lowgroup
We dohave a qualifiedopinionon whichsamplewillhavethehighestvalue,but as thereare
donelittleor nonepreviousresearchon thismatterin Nordiccountrieswe havenevertheless
usedtwotailedtests in orderto detectwhetheronegrouphas higheror lowerranksumsthan
the other.
Table4 presentsthe resultsof the Mann-Whitneytests.Thereare 49 debt categorieswhere
the high groupdifferssignificantlyfromthe low goup. Severalof the tests,does,however,
havemediansof zeroforbothgroups,whichis a resultof manyzeroutilizationobservations
and we have chosen to not put too much emphasison these debt classes in the initial
assessment.We will instead discuss these instrumentsfurtherwhen computingregession
models.
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TABLE 4 - MANN WHITNEY RESULTS
The following figure presents the results of the Mann-Whitney tests. There are presented two figures per
relationship. The upperfigure represents the median of the upper group, whilst the lowerfigure represents the
median of the lower group. The medians arefigures in percentage of total debt. Figures marked with "*" are
significant at a 10% significance level, figures marked with "**" are significant at a 5% significance level,
whereas figures marked with "***" are significant at a 1% significance level. All the other figures are not
significant. Panel A presents the relationship between key ratios and debt types, whereas Panel B presents the
relationship between key ratios and seniority and public/private. All the data, except the market to book and
ratingfigures, are based on 370 observations. The rating variable is based on 274 observations and the market
to book variable is based on 244 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales 0.117 0.071 0.234 0.000 0.000


0.063***
0.233 0.116 0.234 0.000 0.000 - 0•094***
Ln(Sales) 0.209 0.049** 0.439*** 0.000** 0.000


0.104***
0.165 0.133** 0.069*** 0.000** 0.000


0.056***
Intangibility ratio 0.182** 0.004*** 0.488*** 0•000*** 0.000


0.077
0.213** 0.213*** 0.073*** 0.000*** 0.000


0.077
Rating 0.216 0.232** 0.073*** 0.000 0.000


0.138
0.165 0.117** 0.429*** 0.000 0.000


0.077
Net leveragerato 0.176 0.103 0.216 0.000 0.000


0.075
0.219 0.079 0.290 0.000 0.000


0.080
Market to book 0.232* 0.000** 0.319 0.000 0.000


0.063***
0.193* 0.094** 0.300 0.000 0.000 - 0.163***
Panel B - Seniority & Publie/Private
( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )


Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private


EBIT/Sales 0.000 0.829*** 0.000 0.898 0.042


0.000 0.720*** 0.000 0.890 0.110


Ln(Sales) 0.000*** 0.762 0.000*** 0.918** 0.083


0.001*** 0.807 0.000*** 0.838** 0.106


Intangibility ratio 0.000*** 0.829 0.000 0.916 0.080


0.001*** 0.763 0.000 0.858 0.106


Rating 0.040*** 0.560*** 0.000*** 0.775 0.225*


0.816*" 0.000*** 0.895 0.838*


Net leveragerato 0.000 0.763 0.000 0.700*** 0.259***


0.000 0.820 0.000


0.973***


Market to book 0.000* 0.908*** 0.000* 0.911 0.046


0.000* 0.710*** 0.000* 0.929 0.071


44
As seen from table 4 the high profit group of companies in our sample has a significantly
higher utilization of other debt and senior unsecured debt. The utilization of other debt types
does not differ significantly between the high and low profit goups.
Firm size has a significant impact on a firm' s utilization of bonds, program and other debt,
senior unsecured and private debt. Larger firms utilize a significantly smaller portion of
bonds and a larger fraction of program debt than smaller firms, the medians being 0.049 and
0.439 for the largest firms and 0.133 and 0.069 for the smaller firms, respectively. In
addition large firms utilize a significantly larger fraction of other debt than smaller firms.
Firms with high intangible asset ratios utilize significantly less bank debt and bonds, and
more program debt than firms with little intangible assets, the medians being 0.182, 0.004
and 0.488 respectively for the group with the highest intangibility ratio, and 0.213, 0.213 and
0.073 for the group with the lowest intangibility ratio. Highly intangible firms, on the other
hand, utilize significantly more secured debt, than low intangible firms.
Companies have been put into the high or low rating category on the basis if it is investment
grade or speculative grade, the higher group being speculative group. Investment grade
companies utilize significantly less bonds and more progam debt than speculative grade
firms, the medians being 0.232 and 0.073 for the speculative group and 0.177 and 0.429 for
the investment gade group. Furthermore investment grade firms utilize significantly less
secured debt, more senior unsecured debt and more private debt than speculative grade
firms.
Highly levered firms utilize a significantly lower portion of public debt, and (consequently)a
higher portion of private debt. Both of the relationships are highly significant.
There is a week significant relationship between market to book ratio amongst our sample
firms and bank loan ratio. Firms with high market to book ratio utilizes a higher portion of
bank debt than firms with a low market to book ratio. Additionally firms with high market to
book value utilize less bonds and less other debt than low market to book firms, whereas
they utilize significantly more senior unsecured debt and less public debt.
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2. Univariate regression
As a starting point for our regression analysis we have computed several simple linear
regressionsto examine the relationshipsbetween firm variables and debt categories.The
findingsfromtheseregessions arepresentedin table 5.
We have performedsimplelinear regressionsbetween the seven categoriesof debt as the
dependentvariables,and the firm variablesas the explanatoryvariable.This approachhas
been followedto examinewhetherbasicoverarchingand stylizedrelationshipsare presentin
our dataset.In additionwe have done simplelinear regressionswith seniorityand whether
the debt is privateor publicas explanatoryvariables.This exercisehas alsobeen carriedout
using moving average values of the firm variables. This, first of all, smoothens out
observationsfor highly volatile variables. In addition, as debt investorsand banks try to
assessa firm's future cash flow, they are likely to pay attentionto historicalobservations.
Movingaveragevariablescould thus capture a contextwhich a regressionequationusing
updatedannualvariablesmightmiss. All in all, 144linearregessions havebeen conducted.
The numberof observationsused in the regressionsshouldprove be sufficientin order to
achievestatisticalinference(Keller,2005).However,we suspectthe residualsfroma linear
regressionto notbe normallydistributed,andwe haveclearindicationsof heteroscedasticity,
as any linear relationshipis bound to have several residuals on the down side of the
regression line at the first part of the regression line due to a severe amount of zero
observations.Because the zero observationspile up the residua1sare rarely normally
distributed.Bearingthis in mind we assess the results of the univariateregressionmodels
withcertainscepticism.
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TABLE 5- UNIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS
The following table presents regression coefficient for our 72 single regressions. Panel A shows the
relationship between firm variables and the seven main categories we have divided debt into. Panel B shows
the relationship between a moving three year average of ourfirm variables and the seven main categories we
have divided debt into. Figures in brackets indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. " indicates that the
coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5%
significance level. "*"" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1% significance level. No asterisks
signal that the coefficient is not significant. All the data, except the market to book and rating regressions, are
based on 370 observations. The rating regressions are based on 274 observations and the market to book
regressions are based on 244 observations.
Panel A - Linearregression
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales -0.030 -0.019 0.146** -0.081*** -0.032** 0.004 0.012
( 0.061 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.034 )
Ln(Sales) -0.040*** -0.006 0.046*** 0.012*** -0.010*** 0.004*** -0.013***
( 0.007 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.005 )
Intangibility ratio 0.051 -0.188*** 0.241*** -0.061*** 0.003 -0.010 -0.003
( 0.041 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.574 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.021 )
Rating 0.048*** 0.005 -0.062*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.016*** 0.006
( 0.048 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.007 )
Net leveragerato -0.103*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.010 0.004 0.002 -0.009
( 0.026 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.015 )
Market to book -0.001 -0.007** 0.011*** 0.001 0.000 -0.004**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 )
d denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
Panel B - Linearregression vvithmovingawrage
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales 0.263 -0.006 0.335** 0.036*** -0.007** 0.011 -0.055
( 0.109) (0.092 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.043) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.060)
Ln(Sales) -0.003 -0.002 0.046*** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.006*** 0.011**
( 0.008 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.004 )
Intangibility ratio -0.018 -0.072*** 0.051 -0.031** 0.038 0.009 -0.036**
( 0.030 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.016 )
Rating 0.062*** 0.005 -0.077*** 0.011 -0.001 -0.050 0.030***
( 0.012 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.008 )
Net leveragerato -0.100*** 0.071*** 0.018 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.009
( 0.031 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.018 )
Market to book 0.001 -0.009** 0.020*** 0.000 0.000 -0.006**
( 0.004 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
- ( 0.003 )
a d * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
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According to table 5 panel A, profitability has a significant positive influence on a
company's utilization of program debt, mortgage and convertible debt with coefficients
equalling 0.335, 0.036 and -0.007 respectively. Moving average profitability, on the other
hand, has a significant positive influence on the use of mortgage debt. The convertible and
program debt relationships are, however, consistent with the normal regression.
Firm size has a significant relationship with all of the debt types except for bonds. All the
significant coefficients explaining debt instruments are negatively correlated with firm size
except program debt. The situation is rather similar for moving average firm size, with the
exception that bank debt does not have a signfficant relationship as it had with normal firm
size.
A finn's intangibility ratio is significantly influencing a firm' s use of bonds, program and
mortgage debt, with coefficients equalling -0.188, 0.241 and 0.061 respectively. This
indicates that a firm on average reduce the utilization of bonds and mortgage debt, and
increase the use of program debt, the higher intangible ratio the firm has. Moving average
intangibility is coherent with the normal regression on the matter of bonds and program debt.
The other coefficient, except other which yields a negative coefficient at 0.036, are not
significant.
The level of credit rating in the linear model is highly significant with bank, program and
mezzanine debt. Firms tend to issue less bank debt the higher the credit rating they have. The
opposite is true for program and mezzanine debt. The relationship between program debt and
rating is consistent with the relationship between profitability and progam debt, and
suggests that firms tend to utilize more program debt the higher rating the company has.
Companies' moving average rating has several similarities with the normal regression. The
relationship between rating and bonds, program, secured and senior unsecured debt is equal
to the equivalent for the normal regression model. The moving average model shows, in
addition, a positive significant relationship between rating and other debt.
There is a highly significant relationship between net leverage ratio, bank loans and bonds
with coefficients, equalling -0.103, -0.007 respectively. Moving average net leverage ratio
on the other hand is significantly influencing bank debt and bonds with the coefficients of -
0.100 and 0.071.
48
Market to book has a significant relationship with bonds, with a negative coefficient of -
0.007 and positive influence on program debt with a coefficient equalling 0.011. The moving
average regxessionmodel has a similar relationship.
Table 5 presents the relationship between the normal and moving average regression model
and debt seniority and whether debt is public or private. By examining this table we find that
profitability has a significantly relationship with secured and senior unsecured debt on a
normal and a moving average basis. Firm size is the parameter influencing the most
categories. Secured, senior unsecured and public and private debt utilization has a
relationship with firm size that is significant at a 1% significance level. Secured and private
debt is influenced negatively by firm size, whereas senior unsecure, subordinate and public
bonds are influenced positive coefficients of 0.047, 0.064 and 0.102 respectively. Firm size
at a moving average has a relationship with senior unsecured debt which is negative at a 1%
significant level, the coefficient being -0,025. The other coefficient is consistent with the
normal regession.
There are significant relationships between intangibility ratio and secured, subordinated and
public bonds. The higher the intangibility ratio is, the more subordinated and public debt is
utilized. The relationship is the opposite for secured debt. Higher intangibility ratio tends to
lower the use of secured instruments. A firm's moving average intangibly has a negative
influence on a finn's utilization of bonds, mortgage and other, the coefficients being -0,072,
-0,031 and 0,036 respectively.
An increase in normal credit rating10 yields an increase in secured and private debt, and a
reduction in senior unsecured debt and subordinated debt, with coefficients at 0.031, -0.030,
-0.011 and 0.016 respectively. Moving average rating have similar coefficients, however, the
moving average influences the senior unsecured level positively at a significance 1evel of
5%.
The leverage ratio and market to book ratio, both normal and the moving average have
significant coefficients for public and private debt. Public debt utilization decreases with
growth in leverage or market to book, whereas private debt utilization decreases.
I°An increasingin creditratingin this situationimpliesa downgradeby Moody'sas wemeasureAaaas 1andC as 9.
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TABLE 6 - UNIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS
The following table presents regression coefticient for our 72 single regressions. Panel A shows the
relationship between firm variables and seniority, as well as between firm variables and public and private
debt. Panel B shows the relationship between the moving three year average offirm variables and seniority, as
well as betweenfirm variables andpublic and private debt. Figures in brackets indicate standard errorfor the
coeflicients. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "*" indicates that the
coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1%
significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant. All the data, except the market to
book and rating regressions, are based on 370 observations. The rating regressions are based on 274
observations and the market to book regressions are based on 244 observations.
Panel A - Seniority& Public/Prhate


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Finn Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales -0.121** 0.154** 0.001 -0.125 0.194


( 0.048 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.161 )
Ln(Sales) -0.064*** 0.047*** 0.007** 0.102*** -0.029***


( 0.005 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 )
Intangibility ratio -0.073** 0.017 0.064*** 0.187** -0.085


( 0.033 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.066 )
Rating 0.031*** -0.030** -0.011** 0.007 0.016***


( 0.009 ) ( 0.013 ) -( 0.011 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.064 )
Net leveragerato -0.011 0.022 -0.009 -0.386*** 0.329***


( 0.021 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.059 )
Market to book 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.060** 0.032


( 0.003 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.032 )
a d * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales -0.195** 0.662** -0.008 -0.250 0.103


( 0.087 ) ( 0.110 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.228 ) ( 0.221 )
Ln(Sales) -0.025*** -0.025*** 0.006* 0.102*** 0.025**


( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 )
Intangibility ratio -0.014 -0.114*** 0.020* -0.117*** -0.081**


( 0.024 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.041 )
Rating 0.049*** 0.036** -0.009 -0.004 0.048**


( 0.011 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.021 )
Net leveragerato -0.007 0.027 0.014 -0.336*** 0.368***


( 0.025 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.070 )
M arket to book 0.002 0.013** -0.002 -0.041* 0.102***


( 0.003 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.018 )
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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3. Multivariate regressions
In order to further investigate the relationship between firm variables and debt categories we
have constructed several multivariate regression models. These models are our main findings
as they take several aspects into account simultaneously and thus enable us to assess the
relative importance of the different key variables. Using a multiple regression we can for
instance include both profitability and tangibility as explanatory variables simultaneously
and then take into account that a firm can have high profit combined with different levels of
tangibility.
We will start by presenting a multivariate regression including profitability, firm size,
intangibility of assets, and whether the specific observation is from a listed and/or a rated
company. We will continue by including dummy variables to our regession equation for
which year the observation has taken place. The following regression equation will include
dummy variables which identifies which type of industry the specific observation comes
from, before we include dummy variables for which country the observation belongs to and
whether the observation originates from the year of the the financial crisis. We will finish of
the multivariate section by presenting multivariate regressions where we have substituted
profitability, firm size and intangibility with rating, a regression where we have substituted
listing with market to book values, and a regression model that splits profitability into two
variables.
Initialmultivariateregression
Our first regression consists of the parameters profitability, firm size, intangible asset ratio
and whether the observations come from a listed and/or rated company. This provides the
following regression equation;
Debty = 130+ MEBIT /Sales) + f32(1,n(Sales)) + 133(Intangibile asset ratio)
+ /33(Dummy variable f or listined) + MDununy variable f or rated)
+ Ei
The first of the three variables are included in the regression on the basis of the empirical
research conducted by Rauh & Sufi (2010), Lasfer (1999) and Barclay and Smith (1995).
The latter two variables, listing and rating, gives our thesis a dimension that is not included
in Rauh and Sufi (2010), Lasfer (1999) and Barclay and Smith (1995), namely that listed
companies should tend to have a lower asymmetric information level than non-listed
companies because of regulatory requirements that must be met for companies listed on a
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stock exchange.Rated companies,on the other hand, has been proved to have an easier
accessto marketdebt (Fulkender& Petersen,2006)and includingthese two variablesgives
us an opportunityto examinethe effectstheseaspectshaveon debtstructure.
We havenot includedratingandleverageratio into our regressionmodel.This is becauseof
multicollinearity.Rating reflectsa company's probabilityof default and loss given default
(Moody's,2012), two aspectscloselyrelated to profitabilityand intangibilityratio (Weiss,
1990,Johnsen,2011a,p.12).Leverageratio, on the otherhand, is claimed,by Rauhand Sufi
(2010)to havea highlycorrelatedrelationshipwithtangibilityof assets.
Market to book is not includedin order to not discardtoo many observations.Our sample
consists of 246 observations if we only include listed companies, compared to 370
observationsin total. We have thus decided to do the market to book assessmentin a
supplementingregressionin the end.
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TABLE 7 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL
The tables present coefficients from multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against five firm variables, including two dummies, defining the properties of the sample
companies. The seven categories of debt are stated as apercentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A show
the relationship between the firm variables and each of the seven debt categories. Panel B shows the
relationship between the firm variables and seniority, and betweenfirm variables and public or private bonds.
Figures in brackets indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. "*" indicates that the coeflicient is significant
at a 10% significant level. """ indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level. ""*"
indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1% significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is
not significant All the coefficients are based on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debtinstruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales -0.087*** 0.219*** 0.031 0.026*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005


( 0.019 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.010 )
Ln(Sales) -0.024*** -0.039** 0.034*** -0.009*** -0.012*** 0.003 0.020***


( 0.009 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.005 )
Intangibility ratio 0.041*** -0.001 0.245*** -0.048** 0.018*** -0.006 -0.081***


( 0.041 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.022 )
Listed -0.034 -0.172*** -0.04883 -0.017*** 0.013* -0.018 0.074***


( 0.033 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.018 )
Rated -0.221 0.010 0.178*** 0.005 0.014 0.005 -0.020


( 0.033 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.017 )
Constant 0.665*** 0.051* -0.139* 0.144 0.093* -0.007 -0.040


( 0.074 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.039 )
R2 adj. 0.153 0.085 0.162 0.078 0.081 0.038 0.122
and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively


Panel B - Seniority& Pubbc/Private



( 8) (9 ( 10) ( 11 ) ( 12 )


Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private


EBIT/Sales 0.070*** -0.065*** 0.027*** 0.022 -0.128***


( 0.015 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )


Ln(Sales) -0.045*** 0.024** 0.021*** 0.041*** -0.033***


( 0.007 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )


Intangibility ratio 0.009 -0.029 0.060*** 0.092** -0.096***


( 0.033 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.012 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 )


Listed -0.024 -0.023 0.081*** -0.039 0.024


( 0.026 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 )


Rated 0.001 0.043 0.039*** 0.213*** -0.207***


( 0.026 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.036 )


Constant 0.498 0.513*** -0.134*** -0.115*** 1.065***


( 0.059 ) ( 0.078 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.082 )


R2 adj. 0.121 0.088 0.253 0.149 0.175


***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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From table 7, panel A, we can examine what impact our parameters have on the fraction of
certain utilized debt instrument classes. The regressions indicate that profitability has a
highly significant negative relationship with bank loans, mortgage debt and convertible
bonds. The coefficient is, however, substantially larger in magnitude for bank loans than for
mortgage and convertible bonds, 0.087 versus 0.026 and 0.016, respectively. The regession,
furthermore, claims there to be a highly significant positive relationship between profitability
and bonds, with a positive coefficient of 0.29. The other debt instruments do not have any
significant relationship with profitability according to our initial multivariate regression.
Firm size, as seen in panel A, significantly influences the utilization rate of all our debt
instrument classes, except mezzanine. Bank loans, bonds, mortgage and convertible debt is
negatively influenced by firm size. Firm size has the largest coefficients towards bonds and
banks in magnitude, 0.039 and 0.024, respectively. Firm's size impact on mortgage and
convertible is lower, with coefficients at -0.009 and -0.0012. This is natural given the fact
that the average utilization for bank and bonds is much higher than for mortgage and
convertible (table 7). Program and other debt are positively influenced by firm size, with
highly significant coefficients equalling 0.034 and 0.02 respectively.
The intangible ratio has a highly significant influence on bank loans, program debt and
convertibles. The respective coefficients are 0.041, 0.245 and 0.018, thus program debt is, by
far, the most influenced debt instrument class. Mortgage and other are negatively influenced
by intangibility, with negative coefficients equalling -0.048 and -0.081.
Whether a company is listed influences the utilization level of bonds, mortgage, convertible
and other. The coefficients are all significant at a level below 1%, except convertible which
only is significant at 10%. Bonds and mortgage are negatively influenced by company
listing, with coefficients equalling -0.178 and -0.017 respectively. Convertible bonds and
other debt are significantly positive influenced by company listing, with coefficients
equalling 0.013 and 0.074 respectively. Companies that are rated tends to, according to this
multivariate model, increase their utilization fraction of program debt, which is significant
with a 0.178 positive coefficient.
From table 7 panel B we see the impact different parameters have on debt seniority and
whether debt is public or private. Profitability has a highly significant influence on a
company's fraction of utilized secured, senior unsecured, subordinated and private debt.
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Secured, senior unsecured and private debt are influenced negatively with the respecting
coefficients of -0.07, -0.065, -0.128. The fraction of utilized subordinatedbonds, on the other
hand, increases with profitability with a fraction of 0.027. All the relationships are
significant at a 1% significant level.
Firm size has the same significant relationships with seniority and private debt as
profitability. The difference is that senior unsecured debt is positively influenced by firm
size on a 5% significance level. Public debt is, in addition, highly influenced by firm size.
The coefficient is 0.041 and significant at a 1% level.
Intangibility ratio is highly significant towards secured, subordinated, public and private
debt. All the relationships are highly significant. The coefficients, however, differs
somewhat in magnitude. Subordinated debt has a higher coefficient than secured,
respectively 0.06 and 0.009. Private debt is positively influenced with a coefficient of -0.096
whereas public debt is influenced with a coefficient of 0.092.
Listing increases the fraction of utilized private debt with a coefficient of 0.024. Rating, on
the other hand, has a significantly relationship with subordinated bonds, public and private
debt, which are influenced by the coefficient 0.039, 0.213 and -0.207, respectively. All
coefficients are significant at a 1% level.
Multivariateregressionwithyearvariables
Our second regression model includes dummy variables indicating which year a specific
observation originates from. As presented in the summary statistics, there seems to be certain
trends in the data sample. By including a year specific variable we should be able to
eliminate this effect form the firm value coefficients. The regression equation is thus
expanded to;
Debty = jeo+ je,i(FirmVariables)+ fix,(Year of Observation) + Ei
In addition to philtre out year specifics from the firm variable coefficients, the year dummies
are interesting by themselves, as they may reveal if there are any significant utilization
trends amongst the different years, and describe these trends through coefficients.
We have not included a dummy for 2001 in order to avoid the dummy trap. The constant in
the regression model thus reflect 2001, and the dummy variable coefficients are thus an
expression of the difference between the dummy year and base year, 2001.
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The results from this regressionmodel, presentedin table 8, are rather similar to table 7.
Therearehowever,a fewdiscrepancieswhichwe will commenton.
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TABLE 8 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL WITH YEAR DUMMIES
The tables present coefficients from multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against five firm variables, including two dummies, defining the properties of the sample
companies in addition to ten year dummies that identift what year the observation originatefrom. The seven
categories of debt are stated as a percentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A show the relationship
between the firm variables and each of the seven debt categories. Panel B shows the relationship between the
firm variables and seniority, and between firm variables and public or private bonds. Figures in brackets
indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant
level. """ indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level. ""*" indicates that the
coefficient is significant at a I% significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant. All
the coefficients are based on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales 0.089*** -0.034* 0.031 -0.030*** 0.017*** 0.001 0.004


( 0.021 ) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.011 )
Ln(Sales) -0.025*** -0.001 0.034*** -0.009** -0.012*** 0.003 0.020***


( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.005 )
Intangibility ratio 0.025 -0.161*** 0.244*** -0.046*** 0.017* -0.006** -0.079***


( 0.041 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.022 )
Listed -0.024 0.008 -0.045 -0.019 0.013 -0.019 0•074***


( 0.034 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.018 )
Rated -0.245*** 0.067** 0.176*** 0.009 0.014* 0.005 -0.015


( 0.033 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.018 )
Constant 0.716*** 0.236*** -0.127 0.108*** 0.089*** -0.015 -0.044


( 0.101 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.111 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.024 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.054 )
R2 adj. 0.163 0.089 0.142 0.063 0.070 0.024 0.107
and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Publie/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales 0.084*** -0.046** -0.011 0.028 -0.131***


( 0.017 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.023 )
Ln(Sales) -0.045*** 0.021** 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.032***


( 0.007 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 )
Intangibility ratio 0.006 -0.026 -0.020** 0.100** -0.105**


( 0.033 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.046 ) ( 0.046 )
Listed -0.023 -0.013 0.067*** -0.039 0.030


( 0.027 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.038 ) ( 0.038 )
Rated -0.003 0.049 0.040*** 0.223*** -0.219***


( 0.027 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.038 )
Constant 0.422*** 0.648*** 0.026 -0.039 1.011***


( 0.081) (0.107) (0.025) (0.112) (0.113 )
R2 adj. 0.107 0.080 0.156 0.137 0.165
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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As seen from table 8, the relationship between profitability and bonds has changes from
positive to negative. The coefficient in the latter regession model is only significant on a
10% significance level, compared to 1% in the initial model.
Including year dummies makes firm size's influence on bonds and other debt not significant.
The other relationships are equal or close to equal. Intangibility ratio turns not significant
towards bank loan influence when the year dummies are included. Mezzanine, however,
becomes significantly negatively influenced on a 5% significance level.
A listed company has, according to the regression model including year dummies, only a
significant impact on other debt. Rating, however, significantly influence the fraction of
utilized bank loans, bonds, program and convertible. All but bank loans are influenced
positively. Bank loans and program have the largest coefficients, -0.245 and 0.176
respectively. Both the coefficients are significant at a 1% significance level. In contrast
bonds and convertibles are significant at respectively 5% and 10% with coefficient values
equalling 0.07 and 0.014.
Table 8 panel B does, as panel A, have several similarities to table 7. Profitability has,
however, not any longer a significant relationship with subordinated debt. Intangibility' s
influence on subordinated bonds turns negative once year dummies are included.
Subordinated bonds are influenced with a coefficient equalling -0.02, which is significant at
a 5% level.
The coefficients for the year variables are presented in the appendix. Using this multivariate
regression model, only the fraction of utilized senior unsecured debt is significantly
influenced by which year the observation originates from. As seen in table 8 the years of
2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005 and 2002 significantly lowers the fraction of utilized senior
unsecured debt compared to the base year of 2001.
Even if the year effects are not significant at a 10% level, they do tell a story. As we can see
from appendix 8.5, the large fluctuations in bank loans and bonds, as described in the
summary statistics, are not caught by the firm variable coefficients. We cannot claim this
fluctuation to be due to year specifics, as these variables are not significant, however, they
do give an indication, and we will assess this further after we have included even more
variables to the model.
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Multivariate regression with year and industry specific dummies
The previousmodel did not reveal any significantrelationshipamongstyear variablesand
debt classes.We do not want to discardthe year effectwithoutfurthertestingand we thus
keep the yeardummiesin the nextregressionmodel.The thirdmultivariateregressionmodel
includes dummy variables indicatingwhich industry the specific observationoriginates
from,in additionto whetherthe observationoriginatesfrom the yearof the financialcrises,
definedas the years2008, 2009 and 2010.The financialcrisis seemsto have a vast impact
on the debtutilizationwhenassessingfigure1in the summarystatistics.Wehavein addition
wantedto philtreout eventualindustryspecificsin orderto isolatefirm variableeffecteven
more.Theregressionequationis thusexpandedto;
Debty = f30+ f3,1(FirmVariables) + f3„2(Yearof Observation) + flx,(Industry)
+ f3,4(Financia1Crisis) + Ei
Industrydummiesare includedin orderto philtreout year specificindustrytrendsfromthe
parametercoefficients.The industrydummiesare, however,also interestingin themselves,
as they may reveal if there are any significant structural trends amongst the different
industries.
In order to divideour samplefirms in differentindustrieswe have organizedthemby their
initial letter in the NACEcode register,explainedin section3.5. Our sampleconsistsof 8
differentindustrycategories.To avoidthe dummytrapwe haveexcludedthe othercategory.
The constant reflects the industry categorisedby us as "other". This category includes
conglomeratethat operatesovera widespectreof businessesandthus is unclassifiable.This
categoryis suitableto excludebecauseit's reasonableto believethat it representsthe widest
spectreof industriesof all the NACEcodes.The dummyvariablecoefficientsthus express
the differencebetweenthebroadcategorycalledotherand specificindustryniches.
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TABLE 9 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH YEAR, INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL CRISIS DUMMIES
The tables present coefficients from multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against five firm variables, including two dummies, defining the properties of the sample
companies in addition to ten year dummies that identift what year the observation originate from, 8 NACE
dummies indicating industry and a dummy variable indicating f the observation originates from the financial
crises. The seven categories of debt are stated as apercentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A show the
relationship between thefirm variables and each of the seven debt categories. Panel B shows the relationship
between the firm variables and seniority, and between firm variables and public or private bonds. Figures in
brackets indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 10%
significant level. """ indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level. ""*" indicates
that the coefficient is significant at a I% significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is not
significant. All the coefficients are based on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales -0.079*** -0.031* -0.002 0.030*** -0.001 0.004 0.004


(0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011)
Ln(Sales) -0.010 -0.008 0•035*** 0.016*** -0.006 0.004 0.014**


(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Intangibility ratio 0.025 -0.061 0.157*** -0.061*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.044


(0.052) (0.043) (0.052) (0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.028)
Listed -0.040 -0.109*** 0.063 -0.019 0.011 -0.010 0.102***


(0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.023)
Rated -0.216*** 0.128*** 0.084** 0.018 0.019 0.003 -0.026


(0.034) (0.028) (0.034) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.018)
FinancialCrisis -0.070 -0.114** 0.120** 0.029 -0.061*** -0.017 0.102***


(0.057) (0.046) (0.056) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009) (0.030)
Constant 0.704*** 0.184 -0.367*** 0.420*** 0.031 -0.032 -0.028


(0.131) (0.107) (0.129) (0.045) (0.029) (0.020) (0.069)
R2 adj. 0.201 0.244 0.341 0.361 0.205 0.054 0.195
and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales -0.028** -0.108*** 0.024*** 0.01911 -0.150***


(0.014) (0.022) (0.006) (0.030) (0.029)
Ln(Sales) 0.000 -0.020* 0.033*** 0.076*** -0.071***


(0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.015) (0.014)
Intangibility ratio 0.001 -0.013 0.067*** -0.07349 0.09123


(0.034) (0.052) (0.014) (0.070) (0.069)
Listed -0.091*** -0.002 -0.063*** -0.213*** 0.209***


(0.029) (0.044) (0.012) (0.054) (0.054)
Rated 0.039 0.027 0.033*** 0.102** -0.092*


(0.023) (0.034) (0.009) (0.048) (0.047)
FinancialCrisis -0.031 0.016 0.021 -0.00792 0.00309


(0.037) (0.056) (0.016) (0.068) (0.067)
Constant 0.240*** 0.862*** -0.327*** -0.649*** 1.628***


(0.086) (0.130) (0.036) (0.162) (0.161)
R2 adj. 0.437 0.227 0.416 0.348 0.401
***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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As presented in table 9, the multivariate regession including industry and financial crises
dummies, have several similarities with the regression model with only year dummies. There
are, however, some discrepancies amongst the models.
Firstly, the influence from profitability on convertible turns not significant when industries
and financial crises are included. Secondly, the coefficient describing the relationship
between firm size and bank loans are no longer significant in the latter model. Thirdly, the
significance of the coefficient describing mortgage increases when the model is expanded.
The value of the coefficient also increases slightly. For the fourth, intangibility rate loses its
significant influence on bonds, mezzanine and other.
Listed companies has a significantly lower fraction of bonds than companies that are not
listed, on the contrary to the previous regession model where listing only had a significant
influence on other debt. There are no changes in the listing coefficients that are significant
towards debt instruments. However, the value of the coefficients has change somewhat. The
program debt coefficient declines from 0.176 to 0.084, whereas the bonds coefficient
increases from 0.128 to 0.067.
The financial crisis has a significant relationship towards bonds, progam, convertible and
other debt. The influence on bonds and convertible are negative, the coefficient have the
respective values of -0.114 and -0.061. Program debt and other has a positive relationship
with the financial crises, 0.120 and 0.102 respectively. Even if not significant, the coefficient
explaining the relationship between the financial crisis and bank debt indicates what was
expected looking at figure 1 in the summary statistic. Bank debt grew substantially in the
two year prior to the crisis, before it declined through the crisis. The coefficient indicates a
negative relationship at -0.07.
There are several significant industry dummies (see 8.6). NACE group D, H, J and N, which
are indicators for electricity and gas industry, transportation industry, information &
communication industry and administrative services, respectively, utilizes a significantly
smaller fraction of bank debt then the base NACE group, with coefficients ranging from -
0.122 to -0.266. Bonds on the other hand are utilized significantly more by NACE C and G,
which are indicators for manufacturing industry and wholesale & retail industry, with
coefficient values at 0.257 and 0.104 respectively. Program debt is significantly higher
utilized by the wholesale, transportation, information & communication and administrative
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industry, then by the base group, with coefficients of 0.230, 0.423, 0.454 and 0.258. As for
mortgage, all the industries utilize a lower fraction than the other group. This thus indicates
that the group containing other are biased towards mortgage loans.
From panel B we can see that the relationship between utilized subordinated bonds and firm
variables increase significantly when industry variables are included. Firm size is no longer
significant, as the coefficient is increased to zero. Listing, on the other hand, has turned
significant with a coefficient at -0.091. The other coefficients remain close to constant.
The coefficient describing the relationship between firm size and the fraction of utilized
secured debt turns significant when industry variables are included. The coefficient describes
a negative impact on the fraction of secured debt when firm size increases.
Intangibility loses its relative importance when industry variables are included. Only the
influence on subordinated bonds says significant. The coefficient, however, turns from -0.02
to 0.067.
Several coefficients for listing turn significant when industry variables are included. The
fraction of utilized secured debt is reduced significantly once a company gets listed.
Simultaneously public debt utilization decreases whereas the private debt utilization
increases.
The rating coefficients do not change particularly in value when industry variables are
included. The significant level, however, changes somewhat. The relationship between
whether a company is rated and the fraction of utilized public debt is significant at a 5%
level once industry variables are included, compared to 1% pre industry variables. The
rating/private coefficient turns even less significant, and is significant at a 10% level once
industry is included.
Several of the industry variables are highly significant, as seen in appendix 8.6. The mining
and quarrying industry utilizes a higher fraction of secured debt than the basis group, having
a coefficient of 0.481. All the other coefficients, except the wholesale and retail industry,
however, have a significantly more negative influence on secured utilization the basis group,
whereas the electricity & gas industry and the administrative services have the most negative
coefficients, being -0.245 and -0.237 respectively. The mining and quarry industry have a
significant negative impact on the fraction of utilized senior unsecured debt, the coefficient
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being -0.495. The information & communication industry, on the other hand, utilizes
significantly more senior unsecured debt, however in much smaller magnitude than the
mining & quanying industry with a coefficient being 0.143. The mining & quarrying,
electricity & gas, wholesale and transportation industries utilize a significantly higher
fraction of subordinated bonds than the base category, with coefficients ranging from 0.08 to
0.212. The public coefficients are significant for all the different industries except for
administrative services. Most of the coefficients have large values, the information &
communication industry for instance has a coefficient of 0.801.
Only the year variables describing the utilization of mezzanine debt are significant. As seen
in appendix 8.6, however, the fluctuation of the coefficients going from year to year seems to
indicate what we assessed from the statistical summary, figure 1, that there are certain
trends.
Multivariate regression with year, industry specifies and nation variable
The third regression equation showed no or little significance for the year variables.
However, we still believe there to be coherence between the year of the observation and
utilization level, and we thus keep the dummy variables representing observation year when
we expand our regi-essionmodel even further. The statistical summary seems to reveal that
there are differences amongst the average debt structures amongst the Nordic countries. To
remove this effect from the other variables we introduce dummy variables that indicate the
origination country of the observation. The regjession equation is thus expanded to;
Debty = flo+ 13x1(FirmVariables)+ f3,2(Yearof Observation) + 13,3(Industry)
+ 13x4(FinancialCrisis)+ Px,(Country) + Ei
Country dummies are included in order to philtre out national trends from the firm variable
coefficients. The country dummies are, in addition, interesting in themselves, as they may
reveal if there are any significant utilization trends amongst the different Nordic countries.
To avoid the dummy variable trap we have excluded Norway from the country variables.
Thus we use Norway as the base country, and all the other country dummy variables are
measured according to Norway.
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TABLE 10 - COMPLETE MULTIVARIATE REGRES SION MODEL
The tables present coefficientsfrom multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against five firm variables, including two dummies, defining the properties of the
sample companies in addition to ten year dummies that identift what year the observation originatefrom, 8
NACE dummies indicating industry, a dummy variable indicating if the observation originates from the
financial crises and dummies indicating country. The seven categories of debt are stated as apercentage of
total interest bearing debt. Panel A show the relationship between theparameters and each of the seven debt
categories. Panel B shows the relationship between the parameters and seniority, and between parameter
and public or private bonds. Figures in brackets indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. "*" indicates
that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "**" indicates that the coefficient is significant
at a 5% significance level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a I% significance level. No
asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant. All the coefficients are based on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds


Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine OtherProgram
EBIT/Sales -0.060*** -0.064"* 0.007 -0.026*** 0.001 0.003 0.011


(0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012)
Ln(Sales) 0.005 -0.018* 0.043*** -0.028*** -0.006* 0.000 0.019***


(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
Intangibility ratio -0.031 0.002 0.187*** -0.093*** -0.005 -0.009 -0.048*


(0.051) (0.041) (0.051) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.028)
Listed -0.033 -0.123*** 0.043 0.02 0.008 -0.004 0.095***


(0.045) (0.036) (0.045) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.025)
Rated -0.202*** 0.089*** 0.080** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.007 -0.022


(0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.018)
FinancialCrisis -0.094* -0.088" 0.092* 0.058*** -0.064*** -0.009 0.088***


(0.055) (0.045) (0.055) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.031)
Constant 0.520 0.390 -0.427*** 0.502*** 1.123*** -0.010 -0.097


(0.143) (0.117) (0.143) (0.043) (0.033) (0.021) (0.080)
R2 adj. 0.291 0.339 0.401 0.58 0.233 0.186 0.197
and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Publie/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales 0.026*** -0.112*** 0.023*** -0.009 -0.096***


(0.014) (0.022) (0.006) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln(Sales) -0.012* -0.005 0.029*** 0.040*** -0.027"


(0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.012)
Intangibility ratio -0.012 0.038 0.062*** 0.101** -0.097*


(0.034) (0.051) (0.014) (0.050) (0.050)
Listed -0.060 -0.029 -0.066*** -0.034 0.035


(0.030) (0.045) (0.013) (0.045) (0.045)
Rated 0.051** -0.005 0.039*** 0.159*** -0.152***


(0.023) (0.034) (0.009) (0.033) (0.033)
FinancialCrisis -0.004 -0.011 0.024 0.055 -0.068


(0.038) (0.056) (0.016) (0.055) (0.055)
Constant 0.350** 0.843*** -0.335*** -0.102 1.007***


(0.098) (0.145) (0.041) (0.143) (0.144)
R2 adj. 0.460 0.293 0.450 0.402 0.425
***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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Including nation variables alters the significancelevel of the coefficientexplainingthe
relationshipbetweenprofitabilityandbonds.The coefficientwhenthe variableis includedis
significantat 1%significancelevel.Theothercoefficientsare equalin termsof significance,
and the values of the profitabilitycoefficientare equal or close to equal to the regression
modelnot includingnationvariables.
There are minor changesto the firm size coefficientswhen includingnationvariables.The
value of the mortgagecoefficientis increasedin magnitudefrom -0.016to -0.028,and the
significanceof the othercoefficientis alteredfrom5%to 1%.
Intangibilityratio and listing are similar to firm size and the only alterationsare minor
changesin the coefficientvalues.
The number of significantrating and fmancial crisis coefficientsincreaseswhen nation
variablesare included.As for the ratingcoefficients,mortgagedebtturnssignificanton a 1%
level.Financialcrisis,on the otherhand,has a significantinfluenceonbankdebtoncenation
variablesareincluded.Theothercoefficientsremainrelativelyunchanged.
The industrydummiesremains quite similar to the model where nation variablesare not
included.The discrepanciesare that the manufacturingdummyhas a significantlyinfluence
on bondutilizationin the lattermodelwitha coefficientequalling-0.214.The information&
communicationindustry and administrativeservices turn significanton the influenceon
programdebtwhennationvariablesare includedwithcoefficientsequalling0.035and0.048
respectively.
The nation variable implementationincreases the number of year dummies that have a
significantimpacton mortgageutilization(see appendix8.7).Year 2010 and 2008have a
significantlylowerfractionof mortgagedebt thanthe baseyearwith coefficientsequalling-
0.05and -0.046respectively
What country the security is issued in has a significantimpact on the fraction of debt
utilizationaccordingto our regressionmodel. Denmarkand Icelandutilizesa significantly
higher fractionof bank loans than Norwegianfirrns,with coefficientsequalling0.258 and
0.333 respectively.Bonds on the other hand are utilized significantlyless by Danish and
Icelandicfirmsby the samecoefficientfactorin magnitudeas the bank debt. Swedishfirms
do in additionutilizea significantlylessfractionof bondsas well,witha coefficientvalueof
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-0.156. As for program debt only Danish firms has a significantly different utilization rate
from Norway, with a coefficient of -0.231. Mortgage debt, on the other hand is utilized
significantly more in Sweden and Denmark with coefficients equalling 0.052 and 0.148
respectively, and significantly less in Iceland and Finland with coefficients of -0.075 and -
0.045, respectively.
From panel B we can see that firm size influence the fraction of utilized senior unsecured
debt turns not significant when nation variables are included. Intangibility ratio, on the other
hand, turns significant in its relationship with public and private, with coefficients of 0.101
and -0.97 respectively. Whether a company is listed or not only has a significant influence
on the fraction of utilized subordinated bonds. If a company is rated it has a significant
impact on secured debt once nation variables are included.
Finnish companies have a significantly lower fraction of utilization of secured debt
compared to Norway, whereas Swedish and Danish companies have significantly lower
utilization of senior unsecured debt with coefficients equalling -0.141 and -0.285
respectively. As for public and private utilization fraction, all the companies have lower
utilization of public bonds and higher private debt utilization.
Multivariate regression with rating
As stated in the beginning of section 3 under Findings, we have discarded the level of credit
rating in the five previous models we have presented due to multicollinearity. Rating is still
thought to have a great impact on debt structure, as indicated by figure 2 and 3 in the
summary statistics, and we have thus computed a multivariate regression model using credit
rating as the only firm variable. Rating ranges from Aaa to C, and we have incorporated this
into the regession model by assigning each letter a number. Aaa is indicated by 1 and C is
indicated by 9. Thus, an increasing value in the rating coefficient implies an worsening credit
rating.We have decided to include all the other variables that have been included through the
three previous equations. That is origination year, financial crisis, industry and country
effect. The regression equation is thus;
Debty = /30+ fl1(Credit Rating) + f3,2(Year of Observation) + ,6,3(Industry)
+ px.(Financial Crisis) + f3,5(Country) + Ei
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TABLE 1 1 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL CREDIT RATING AND YEAR DUMMIES
The tables present coefficientsfrom multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against credit rating, ten year dummies that identift what year the observation
originate from, 8 NACE dummies indicating industry, a dummy variable indicating if tlw observation
originatesfrom thefinancial crises and dummies indicating country. The seven categories of debt are stated
as a percentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A show the re1ationshipbetween the parameters and
each of the seven debt categories. Panel B shows the relationship between theparameters and seniority, and
between parameter and public or private bonds. Figures in brackets indicate standard error for the
coefficients. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "**" indicates that
the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance leveL "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a
1% significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant. All the coefficients are based
on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
Rating 0.058*** 0.003 -0.041*** 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.009


( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.007 )
Constant 0.102 0.13569 0.184 0.362*** -0.039 0.000 0.014


( 0.086 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.067 )
FinancialCrisis 0.027 -0.157*** -0.076 0.043** -0.076*** -0.005 0.114***


( 0.046 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.036 )
R2 adj. 0.420 0.351 0.394 0.555 0.310 0.257 0.099
***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11 ) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
Rating 0.024*** -0.019 0.012** -0.007 0.052***


( 0.008 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.013 )
Constant 0.293*** 0.625*** -0.112*** 0.188 0.522***


(0.073) (0.117) (0.042) (0.130) (0.117)
FinancialCrisis 0.022 0.210*** 0.051** -0.111 -0.042


( 0.039 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.063 )
R2 adj. 0.522 0.300 0.332 0.281 0.454
***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
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The regxessionmodelusingratingas a firm variableyieldsseveralsignificantrelationships.
Ratinghas a negativeinfluenceon bankdebt, as the coefficientis significantequalling0.058
(Aaa is indicatedas 1 and Cc is indicatedas 8). Programdebt is on the contrarynegative
correlated with debt, yielding a highly significant coefficient of -0.041. Rating also
influences the utilization of secured, subordinated and private debt significantly,with
coefficientstotalling0.024and -0.012and 0.052respectively.
Financialcrisis influencesthe level utilizationof bonds and mortgagedebt. Bondshave a
highly negativecoefficientat -0.157 and mortgagea significantcoefficientat 0.043. Both
convertibleand other debt are also significantlyinfluencedby the financialcrisis according
to the model, yielding highly significant coefficients equalling -0.076 and 0.114. The
financial crisis is in addition significantly correlated to senior unsecured debt and
subordinatedbonds,havingcoefficientsof -0.210and 0.051,respectively.
Multivariate regression with growth opportunities
As includingthe market-to-bookratio in the multivariateregressionswouldhave omitteda
significant fraction of our sample, we chose to include a dummy variable for listing.
However,we do not intendto precludethe market-to-bookvariable,as this is a goodproxy
to a firm's growthopportunities.We havethus constructeda regressionmodel that includes
the market-to-bookratio in additionto all the otherfirmvariablesand dummyvariablesused
in the previousregressionmodel.
As seen fromtable 12,this multivariateregressionhas a highR-squared,but the coefficients
for market-to-bookare not significantfor any of the debt types or seniorities,except for
programdebt at a 5% significancelevel. Most of the other coefficientsalter substantially
when Market-to-Bookis included in the model. We have chosen to not put too much
emphasison this modelas the changesare due to the incorporationof a variablethat barely
showany significance.
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TABLE 12 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL MARKET TO BOOK
The tables present coefficientsfrom multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against five firm variables, including one dummies, defining the properties of the
sample companies in addition to ten year dummies that identift whatyear the observation originatefrom, 8
NACE dummies indicating industry, a dummy variable indicating if the observation originates from the
financial crises and dummies indicating country. The seven categories of debt are stated as apercentage of
total interest bearing debt. Panel A show the relationship between theparameters and each of the seven debt
categories. Panel B shows the relationship between the parameters and seniority, and between parameter
and public or private bonds. Figures in brackets indicate standard errorfor the coefficients. "*" indicates
that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "**" indicates that the coefficient is significant
at a 5% significance level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1% significance level. No
asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant. All the coefficients are based on 370 observations.
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Parameters Bank Bonds Program Mortga,gv Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales 0.497*** -0.563*** -0.198 0.070* 0.036


0.157


0.153 0.149 0.152 0.039 0.034


0.121
Ln(Sales)
-0.026 -0.023 0.037 -0.007 -0.005


0.024


0.018 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.004


0.015
M arket/Book -0.001 -0.005 0.006** 0.000 -0.001


0.000


0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001


0.003
Intangibility ratio 0.232*** -0.110** -0.097* -0.026* 0.024**


-0.024


0.056 0.054 0.055 0.014 0.012


0.044
Rated -0.133*** 0.125*** 0.003 0.030*** 0.030***


-0.055


0.036 0.035 0.036 0.009 0.008


0.029
FinancialCrisis -0.132** -0.093 0.108** 0.032** -0.043***


0.127


0.059 0.058 0.059 0.015 0.013


0.047
Constant 0.877*** 0.382* -0.317 0.074 0.016


-0.033*


0.222 0.215 0.220 0.056 0.049


0.175
R2 adj. 0.400 0.322 61.300 0.512 0.417


0.112
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11) ( 12 )
Parameters Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
EBIT/Sales 0.408*** -0.302* -0.016 -0.369** 0.369**


0.103 0.164 0.041 0.147 0.147
Ln(Sales) 0.057*** -0.137*** 0.033*** -0.021 0.021


0.012 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.018
Market/Book -0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.000


0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003
Intangibilityratio 0.007 -0.004 0.043*** -0.231*** 0.231***


0.037 0.059 0.015 0.053 0.053
Rated 0.016 0.085** 0.007 0.150*** -0.150***


0.024 0.039 0.010 0.035 0.035
FinancialCrisis -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.002


0.040 0.063 0.016 0.057 0.057
Constant -0.687*** 2.380*** 0.363*** 0.447** 0.553***


0.148 0.237 0.059 0.213 0.213
R2 adj. 0.507 0.405 0.469 0.584 0.584
*** ** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
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Multivariate regression model with profitability split
Our final regession model examines if management of a firm reacts differently to changes in
profitability depending on the profitability being positive or negative. This is an interesting
angel on the determination of debt structure as a normal regression model only estimates one
coefficient, which assumes there to be a constant relationship between the coefficient and the
independent variable no matter how high or low the independent variable is. By dividing the
variable into two different variables we can interpret the relative effect an increase in
profitability have on debt utilization and examine if there are difference between highly
profitable companies, and companies with negative profitability. We have chosen to use our
initial regression model and increased this model with one variable through dividing
profitability into two. The regression equation is thus:
Debty = f30+ pi(Positiv.Profit) + I32(Abs.Negative.Profit)
+ [33(Intangibile asset ratio)+ P3(Dummy variable for listined)
+ 134(Dummy variable for rated) + Ei
In the regression equation the Positiv.Profit variable takes the value of the profitability if this
is positive, simultaneously as Abs.Negative.Profit takes the value of zero. If the profits, on
the other hand, are negative, the variable Abs.Negative.Profit takes the absolute value of the
profitability, simultaneously as Positiv.Profit takes the value of zero.
As seen from table 13 the two profitability variables tend to not be significant
simultaneously. An increase in profitability when it is positive, yields a reduction in the
utilization of bonds, other debt and private debt, whereas it increases the utilization of
program and secure debt. A change in profitability, once it is negative reduces the utilization
of senior unsecured debt, and increases the utilization of mortgage and secured debt. The two
profitabilities are never simultaneously significant while they yield diverging coefficients.
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TABLE 13 - MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH PROFITABILITY SPLIT
The tables present coefficientsfrom multivariate regressions where the seven categories of debt are used as
dependent variables against six firm variables, including two dummies, defining theproperties of the sample
companies. The seven categories of debt are stated as a percentage of total interest bearing debt. Panel A
show the relationship between the parameters and each of the seven debt categories. Panel B shows the
relationship between the parameters and seniority, and between parameter and public or private bonds.
Figures in brackets indicate standard error for the coefficients. "*" indicates that the coefficient is
significant at a 10% significant level. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance
level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1% significance level.
the coefficient is not significant. All the coefficients are based on 370 observations
Panel A - Debt instruments
No asterisks signal that


( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Firm Variables Bank Bonds Program Mortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
Pos.Profitability 0.105 -0.275** 0.331** 0.011 -0.035 -0.016 -0.121*


0.073 0.063 0.076 0.048 0.029 0.019 0.067
Neg.Profitability
-0.011 -0.082 0.018 0.129*** 0.019 -0.002 -0.070


0.128 0.109 0.133 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.039
Ln(Sales) -0.001 -0.015 0.028*** 0.000 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.006


0.075 0.064 0.078 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004
Intangibility ratio 0.047 -0.182*** 0.249*** -0.046*** 0.018 -0.007 -0.080***


0.009 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.022
Listed -0.064 0.014 -0.013 -0.023* 0.003 -0.018*** 0.100***


0.042 0.036 0.044 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.018
Rated -0.217*** 0.047 0.160*** 0.012 0.020*** 0.005 -0.027


0.034 0.029 0.035 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.018
Constant 0.464*** 0.379*** -0.140* 0.053* 0.059*** 0.004 0.180***


0.034 0.029 0.035 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.039
R2 adj. 0.109 0.097 0.170 0.100 0.053 0.034 0.108
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private


( 8 ) ( 9 ) ( 10 ) ( 11) ( 12 )
Firm Variables Secured Sen.Unsec Subordin. Public Private
Pos.Profitability 0.186* 0.019 -0.063 0.229* -0.229*


0.056 0.130 0.040 0.134 0.134
Neg.Profitability 0.147** -0.126* 0.016 0.046 -0.046


0.099 0.076 0.023 0.079 0.079
Ln(Sales) -0.043*** 0.037*** 0.012*** 0.038*** -0.038***


0.058 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.009
Intangibility ratio 0.016 -0.030 0.052*** 0.094 -0.094**


0.007 0.043 0.013 0.044 0.044
Listed -0.007 -0.047 -0.068*** -0.014 0.014


0.033 0.035 0.011 0.036 0.036
Rated -0.007 0.045 0.032*** 0.202*** -0.202


0.026 0.034 0.011 0.035 0.035
Constant 0•435*** 0.404*** -0.053** -0.123 1.123***


0.026 0.074 0.023 0.077 0.077
R2 adj. 0.170 0.070 0.169 0.153 0.153
***,** and* denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5%and 10%level,respectively
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4.2.2 Discussion of findings
The significance of our results varies amongst the different firm variables and debt classes.
In this section we will discuss each parameter, and interpret our findings in the context of
established corporate debt structure theory. We have chosen to focus our discussion on
relationships that are significant throughout the majority of our tests or observations that
contradicts established theory and previous empirical evidence.
Profitability
We have assessed EBIT/sales as a proxy for profitability, as discussed in section 3.5.
Our first finding is that profitability has a highly significant negative influence on bank debt.
This is consistent in all our regression models (except the one that includes market-to-book)
as well as the Mann-Whitney test. This is contrary to the findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010),
however, our findings thus seem to back the pecking order theory. The pecking order claims
that firms which run out of internal funding will prefer to issue the least information
sensitive type of capital. The rationale behind this theory is built on the lemon problem
where, in the end, only poorly performing companies would issue equity (Akerlof, 1970).
According to the pecking order theory, this yields a preference hierarchy where internal
funding is the preferred funding then follows bank debt, market debt, hybrid securities and
then equity (Frank & Goyal, 2007). Bank debt is superior to market debt due to the
monitoring possibility of banks that reduces the lemon problem substantially (Berger &
Udell, 1995). Our findings thus seem to support the pecking order theory as one should
expect companies, once profitability is being reduced, to prefer to issue bank debt. Market
debt will only be issued if, and when bank debt becomes unavailable. Companies whose
profitability increases should also be expected to prioritise to repay bank debt as this enables
the company to draw bank loans if the profitability worsens in the future.
Following the traditional rationale behind the pecking order we would expect our findings to
claim there to be an increasingly positive relationship the more information sensitive the
debt instrument is. Our regression model, is however, somewhat inconsistent with this
rationale as bonds have a larger coefficients in magnitude than bank loans in two of our
regression models, namely the multivariate regression model only emphasizing rating and
the model including market-to-book. Both of the models claim there to be a positive
relationship between profitability and bank debt. Bonds, on the other hand, have a negative
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relationship. This is inconsistent with the traditional explanation of the pecking order, but it
is consistent with the findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010). Rauh and Sufi (2010) barely
comments on this in their study, but an argument why a positive coefficient may actually be
in line with the pecking order is that the more profitable a company gets, the easier the
access to bank loans will be. If we still assume that firms will prefer bank debt over other
types of securities, one should anticipate seeing profitable companies retire market debt and
relying increasingly on bank debt the more profitable the company gets. Measured as a
fraction of total debt, this should then provide a positive linear relationship between
profitability and bank debt. This is, however, as Rauh and Sufi (2010) comments, not the
traditional interpretation of the pecking order, and is only supported by two of our models.
The coupons on mortgage debt and convertibles are lower than for other debt instrument due
to the mortgage being secured and convertibles having a potential upside in addition to the
bond yield (Fabozzi, 2005). Companies performing poorly thus have an advantage in issuing
these types of securities. High coupons give profitable companies a tax shield which has a
certain value. Taking the profitability out of the account, the tax effect disappears, and one
should on this basis alone see that poorly performing companies tend to issue more mortgage
and convertible debt than well performing companies. Our findings support this, especially
the multivariate regression model with the profitability split, which indicates that when
companies experience negative profitability they increase the utilization of mortgage debt.
The relationship between profitability and convertibles is in fact not significant in several of
our tests; however, it is clearly negative in the tests where the coefficient is significant.
Convertibles are a useful tool to avoid the lemon problem (Stein, 1992). If company that is
already substantially levered opts for convertible debt financing, it will be perceived as
relatively optimistic about future prospects for the share price. This is due to the fact that if
the share price falls, the company will not be able to force conversion, and will be left with
an even higher debt burden. Given the costs of financial distress associated with such a high
level of debt, this is an undesirable outcome for the company. Consequently, the convertible
bond issue should be met with a less negative perception than an equity issue of the same
amount, and reduce the lemon problem (Stein, 1992). We would thus assume to see a
negative relationship between convertibles and profitability, as convertibles, in theory only
will be issued as a substitute to equity. As stated above there are, however, only a few of our
models that support this view.
73
With regards to seniority, our regressions suggest a negative effect of profitability on secured
debt, except for the market-to-book regression. Profitability is an integral part of a
company's probability of default (Mjøs, 2012), and higher profitability should thus indicate
a lower probability of default. Hence, a higher profitability will indicate a lower need for
collateral. This is consistent with the relationship between profitability and mortgage
explained above. Secured debt typically offers a lower yield to investors, and thus reduces
the tax shields for profitable firms, making it more attractive to unprofitable firms.
Profitability show no clear relationship with public debt issues in our models. Private debt is
generally negatively affected by profitability in our regressions. This is coherent with our
findings regarding bank loans and profitability, and is consistent with the pecking order
theory, because bank loans are private debt.
Firm size
As presented in section 3.5 we have used the natural logarithm of the firms' armual sales as a
proxy for the firm size.
In the initial multivariate regression, firm size showed a significant negative relationship
with the fraction of bank debt. This dependence was also evident in the simple linear
regression, suggesting that the larger the company, the lower the utilization of bank debt.
However, this relationship cannot be justified by looking at the remaining tests and
regressions, as neither the Mann-Whitney test, nor the remaining regressions showed any
significant relationships. Lasfer (1999) recognized a negative relationship between firm size
and bank debt, as he found that smaller firms utilized significantly more bank debt. These
findings were supported by Hackbarth, Hennessey and Leland (2007) which found that
market debt should be a larger fraction of total debt when firm size increases. With our
results being largely not significant describing this relationship, they do not determine any
particular relationship between firm size and bank debt.
Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997) and Denis and Mihov (2003) all find that the
percentage of market debt to total debt increases with firm size. By assessing our
regessions, firm size shows a negative relationship to bond loans, and a positive correlation
with program debt. A possible explanation may be that regular bonds have a more rigorous
issuing process than program debt (Fabozzi, 2005). Program debt is the debt instrument with
the highest coefficient in magnitude. This indicates that when a firm changes in firm size it
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will prefer to issue the most accessible debt instrument. When the company is in the position
to retire debt, it will, for the same rationale, prefer to retire program debt, as this leaves room
for potential issues of program debt in the future if higher leverage is needed.
The positive relationship between progam debt and firm size is also supported by the
findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010), however, this relationship is not discussed exhaustive in
previous research.
All our findings indicate a negative relationship between firm size and mortgage debt. This
is coherent with previous studies (Barclay & Smith, 1995 and Lasfer, 1999) which finds a
significant negative dependence of secured debt on firm size in their samples. As mortgage
is secured debt by definition, this should prove to be valid rationale for mortgage debt as
well.
Convertible debt shows a negative significant relationship with firm size for the initial
multivariate regression, the multivariate regression with a year specific variable and the
multivariate regression with profitability split. The remaining regressions also show a
negative relationship, though not significant. Thus we do question what to assess from this,
as our results contradicts the findings of Lasfer (1999), which suggests that larger firms rely
more heavily on convertible debt than smaller firms.
The category for other debt, however, shows a positive significant relationship with firm size
in all our multivariate regressions and in the Mann-Whitney test, except the regessions
including market-to-book ratio and profitability split. This relationship has not been
discussed uniformly in the literature on debt structure, as the relationship obviously will be
entirely defined by the types of debt included in the other category. Amongst others, we
have included acquisition notes and financial leases in this category. Larger firms have a
relative advantage in issuing public debt (Barclay & Smith, 1995), and capital leases are
never issued publicly. This aspect suggests a negative correlation between other debt and
firm size. On the other hand, the size of a company is a function of the firms' past
investment opportunities (Barclay & Smith, 1995) suggesting that larger firms are relying on
acquisition financing to a larger extent than smaller firms. This may a reasonable explanation
for why other debt is positively dependent on firm size. Nevertheless, because the other debt
category also includes unclassified issues, the properties of the incorporated issues differ
largely, and thus we cannot say anything more specific about the underlying relationships.
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Our examination of the effect of firm size on the utilized level of secured debt to total
interest bearing debt, suggests a negative relationship. This is the same relationship
recognized by Lasfer (1999) for UK companies, a view supported by Barclay and Smith
(1995) and our findings regarding mortgage debt.
With regards to senior unsecured debt, the initial multivariate regression, the one including a
year specific variable and the one with a profitability split, show a positive relation to firm
size. This is corresponding to the findings of Lasfer (1999) for UK companies, recognizing
that large companies generally issues unsecured and subordinated securities. However, our
findings are diverging on this relationship, and we are not able to perform a proper
assessment of these findings.
Our findings is coherent with Lasfer (1999) and Barclay and Smith (1995) which suggest a
positive relation between firm size and the fraction of subordinated debt, as all our
multivariate regressions support this. Evidently, our findings support empirical research, but
this is not thoroughly discussed in these studies and we thus choose not to elaborate further
on the underlying relationships.
Our results indicate that firm size has positive correlation with the level of public debt. This
suggests that larger companies use more public debt, i.e. more public bonds and public
medium term notes. This is consistent with the findings done when examining the effect of
firm size on the different types of debt, as we recognized a positive relationship between
program debt and firm size for Nordic countries. Our finding is supported by Barclay and
Smith (1995) who recognize that public securities have large fixed costs and substantial
scale economies, hence larger companies should have a comparative advantage in issuing
public debt compared to smaller firms. The same rationale is applicable to private debt, and
according to the majority of our tests firm size has a negative correlation with the level of
private debt, These findings are consistent with the empirical results obtained by Lasfer
(1999) for UK companies, and Hackbarth, Hennessey and Leland (2007).
Collateral value
We have used the intangible asset ratio to elucidate the relationship between collateral value
and debt structure.
The Mann-Whitney test suggests that the Nordic companies with the highest intangibility
ratio have the lowest amount of bank debt. This result is contradicted by the initial
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multivariate regression and the one including the market-to-bookratio, which shows a
positive significantcoefficientfor the intangibleasset ratios effecton the fractionof bank
loans.The othermultivariateregressionsdo not provideany significant coefficients,which
meansthat our findingsis in compliancewith Rauh and Sufi (2010)whichdo not find any
clearrelationshipbetweenthe intangibleassetratioandthe fractionof bankdebt.
Total leverageincreaseswith tangibility(Rauh& Sufi2010),but our findingssuggestthat
this increasenot is relatedto an increasein the fractionof bankdebtutilized.Consequently,
our results indicatethat the levelof bank debtnot is dependenton the intangibleassetratio.
A reasonableexplanationis the opportunityof the bank to monitorthe company,so when
there is a bankingrelationshipbetweenthe borrowerand the lender,there is less need for
collateral,as monitoringmay substitutephysicalcollateral(Berger& Udell,1995).Thismay
explainthe non-existentdependencybetweenbankloansandintangibility.
Monitoringopportunitiesare not presentto the same extent for bondholdersand holdersof
programdebt as for banks, so as intangibilitydecreaseleverage,these shoulddecreaseas
intangibilityincrease. The Marm-Whitneytest proposes that as the intangibleasset ratio
increases,the level of bonds to total debt decrease.This is a significantrelationshipat 1%,
which is supported by the multivariate regression including year specific effects and
profitabilitysplit.However,the remainingmultivariateregressionsshowno clearsupportfor
this relationship.In addition,our resultsunanimouslyshowthat intangibilityhas a positive
effect on programdebt for the samplecompanies(except the market-to-bookregression).
Thesefindingsare oppositeof Rauhand Sufi(2010).
Mortgagedebt is significantnegativelycorrelatedwith the intangibleasset ratio for all our
multivariateregressions.This findingis supportedby the linearre&ressions.Bankdebtdoes
not show any relationshipwith tangibilityin our sample,apparentlydue to the abilityof
monitoringby the banks.As tangibilityhas been shownto havea positiveeffecton leverage
(Rauh & Sufi 2010), this may stipulate that debt tied to tangibility,such as mortgage
securities, should decrease the most when intangibilityincreases. Firms might find it
advantageousto issue secured debt because of the lemons problem (Myers and Majluf,
1984).It mightbe costlyto issuesecuritieswheremanagementhavebetter informationthan
investors,but these costs can be avoidedby issuingdebt securedby propertywith known
values. Consequently,firms with assets that can be used as collateralmay be expectedto
issue more debt to take advantageof this opportunity(Titman & Wessels, 1988). Our
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findings support this rationale, as the tests consistently suggest that mortgage decreases with
intangibility.
Convertible debt shows a positive significant relationship with intangibility for the first two
multivariate regressions and the one including profitability split, which is consistent with the
findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010). This is coherent with our findings related to mortgage.
When intangibility is increasing, the asset value of the firm becomes less certain, and
management can avoid the lemon problem of increased asymmetric information by utilizing
convertibles instead of issuing equity.
The intangible asset ratio do not show any clear relationship with secured or senior
unsecured debt, but do show a positive relationship with subordinated debt for the majority
of the multivariate regressions. When a company's intangible asset ratio increases the
fraction of assets available for collateral decreases. This should decrease the fraction of
secured debt. Increasing intangible asset ratio should lead to a higher loss given default
(Weiss, 1990, referred to in Johnsen, 2011b, p. 12). Ceteris paribus, this should lead to a
higher yield on the debt of the company (Håvik, 2011). By issuing subordinated debt, a
company can increase the residual claim on the assets, and thus counter the loss given
default on the main credit line. Consequently, we will expect to see subordinated bonds
increase with intangibility.
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Public listing
The dummy variable representing whether companies are listed or not has been included to
enlighten any significant relationships between a public listing and debt structure.
Our findings do not reveal any relationship between specific types of debt and whether a
company is listed, except for a positive relation to other debt. In addition, the multivariate
regression including the profitability split shows a significant negative relationship between
bank debt and listing. This might be due to decreased asymmetric information as a company
is listed.
The dummy variable for listing shows no clear relationship with secured and senior
unsecured debt. When it comes to subordinated debt, our findings indicate a negative
relationship. This means that listed companies in the Nordics utilize a lower fraction of
subordinated debt than non-listed companies. We believe this finding to be realistic, because
companies that are not listed will typically enclose less information about their operations
and financing. The information is more asymmetrical with regards to private companies
(Johnsen, 2011b), which results in investors demanding a higher residual in order to accept
the same yield.
Some of our multivariate regressions also suggest that listing and public debt is negatively
correlated, but others show no clear correlation. We believe that our findings lack sufficient
consistency in order to ascertain something specific regarding these relationships.
Credit rating
The dummy variable for rating has been included in the multivariate regressions to examine
whether possessing a credit rating itself is affecting debt structure.
Our findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between the level of bank loans,
and whether the company has a rating. We find this to be a sensible connection, as paying to
get a rating and then increase bank loans will be a reverse logic. Banks have monitoring
opportunities, and are not dependent on a credit rating in order to disburse loans, which is
coherent with the findings of Faulkender and Petersen (2006) which recognize that rated
companies issue more bonds and program debt. In addition, banks may have more
information about the borrower than credit agencies. This rationale suggests a negative
relationship between the level of bank loans and whether the company is rated.
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The discussion on bank loans and credit rating is partly supported by our findings on the
relationship between progam and bond loans, and whether a company is rated. For the
majority of the multivariate regressions, this relationship is valid.
Mortgage debt shows no significant relationship with the dummy variable for rating. We
assess this to be a sensible relationship, as mortgage should not have any relationship with
rating as mortgage removes the risk associated with probability of default which rating is
measuring (Moody's, 2012b).
Whether a company is rated or not show no significant consistent relationship with secured
and senior unsecured debt. However, our multiple regressions unanimously suggest a
positive correlation between having a credit rating and the fraction of subordinated debt.
Assuming that increased information is one of the advantages with being listed or rated, we
would assume that the effect of whether a company is rated on subordinated debt would be
the same as for listing and subordinated debt. Hence, we would expect the relationship
between having a credit rating and the fraction of subordinated debt to be negative.
Empirical studies on this matter is limited, which prohibits us from discussing these findings
further in light of empirical theory
Our findings indicate that rated companies in the Nordics have a larger fraction of public
debt, and a lower fraction of private debt. We assess this to be an intuitive result
corresponding to the findings of Houston and James (1996) and Cantillo and Wright (2000),
as companies typically pay for ratings to issue bonds and other notes. Private debt will
include bank debt, which we have observed being negatively correlated with companies
having a credit rating.
Credit quality
A variable for rating is included in a separate multivariate regression due to the
multicollinearity with profitability. Credit quality has been defined in theoretical research as
the primary source of variation driving a firm' s optimal debt structure (Diamond, 1991b and
Bolton & Freixas, 2000).
Our findings suggest that rating has a negative effect on the level of bank loans. This is
supported by both the linear and the multivariate regression, and corresponds to the findings
of previous studies. Hackbart, Hennessey and Leland (2007), Bolton and Freixas (2000) and
Rauh and Sufi (2007) all find that rating have a negative correlation with bank loans.
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The negativerelationshipbetweenbank debt and rating can be explainedwith the pecking
order theory. This relates to the relationshipsstated when discussingprofitabilityabove.
Consequently,our findings for Nordic companiessuggest the same relationshipbetween
ratingand the levelof bankdebtas establishedliteratureandtheory.
When it comesto bond loans, the MannWhitneytest suggestsa negativerelationshipwith
the levelof bondloans.On the otherhand,boththe linearandmultivariateregressionsshow
no significantrelationshipbetweenbond loansand rating.Boltonand Freixas(2000)states
that firmsshouldmovefrombankto non-bankdebt as ratingimproves,andthis is supported
by literature in general (Diamond, 1991b, Chemmanur& Fulghieri, 1994 and Boot &
Thakor,1997).
The findingson the relationshipbetweenbonds and rating suggestthat Nordic companies
differ from U.S companies with regards to bond loans. By looking at program debt,
however, the relationshipto rating is positive. This is in line with establishedempirical
theoryfromthe U.S., and correspondingto the resultsof Boltonand Freixas(2000).Thisis
also supportedby Rauh and Sufi (2010)which finds that lowercredit-qualityfirms do not
have access to program debt. Figure 3 indicates a large differencein the utilizationof
programdebtbetweeninvestmentgradeandspeculativegade forNordiccountries.
Our results indicatea negativerelationshipbetweencredit rating and secureddebt.This is
consistentwithRauhand Sufi(2010)whichstatesthat companieswitha highercreditrating
almostexclusivelyrely on seniorunsecureddebt. Our regressionsalso stipulatethat lower
credit rating have a positiverelationshipwith the level of subordinateddebt. This can be
explainedby companieswith lowercreditratingsutilizingmultipletiers of debt, including
subordinatedand securedissues(Rauh& Sufi,2010).
Growth expectations
Our findingsindicateno significantrelationshipsbetweenthe market-to-bookratio and the
differentdebt types,exceptfor programdebt.This is an interestingfinding,as highmarket-
to-bookindicatesa companythat is expectedto growin the future.Empiricalstudiessuggest
that firms with a high market-to-bookratio use less leverage (Rauh & Sufi, 2010). The
capitalstructureof suchcompaniesis typicallychangingalongwith the company'sgrowth
makingus believethesecompaniesareexploitingthe dynamicnatureofmediumtermnotes.
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Year specific relationships
The year specific variables are not significant at a large, which indicates no relationship
between the year and the type of debt. By assessing the average utilization rate in figure 1, it
seems to be some regression trends that are not captured by our models.
Industry effect
The NACE codes, which represent different industries, show that there are significant
differences among the industries in terms of determinants of debt structure. These codes
were initially included in our model in order to philtre out noise, and thus make the
remaining parameters more accurate. The NACE codes do, however, tell a story of their own
as they clearly indicate differences among industries. Nevertheless, this is of limited
information value due to the low number of companies included in each category.
Nation effect
By including a dummy variable for country, we obtained the regression with the highest R-
squared. Examining the results of the regression suggests significant differences in debt
structure amongst the Nordic countries. This is interesting and as most studies on debt
structure are focused on the U.S., few studies have discussed differences between countries
regarding debt structure.
However, we have few companies representing each country, and we have the same problem
as with the industry effects. They do provide limited information value.
Financial crisis adjustment
An adjustment for the financial crisis is included to compensate for what seems like an
evident trend in debt structure in the years from 2008 to 2010 in figure 1. The financial crisis
variable indicates a decrease in the utilization of bonds and bank debt over these years, and
an increase in the utilization of program debt. The decrease in bond utilization is highly
significant, whereas the effect on bank and program debt is somewhat questionable as one
out of three regessions yields opposite coefficients (positive for bank and negative for
program). The clearly negative coefficient describing the financial crisis' influence on bond
utilization is not observable in figure 1, as bond utilization declines sharply just prior to
2008. Still, the variables indicate that there have been factors, other than our firm variables,
that have influenced the fractions of debt utilization in the years between 2008 and 2010.
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4.3 Significance of unexplained variation
We have through previous sections established some factors that are likely to have a
substantial impact on a company's debt structure. However, we are also keen on examining
whether firms tend to alter their debt structure even if firm specific variables stay constant.
We regard this as a supplement to the section 4.2, in order to back our earlier findings. Our
regression models establish relationships between different firm variables and debt
instruments, seniority and whether debt is public or private. If our models are to have
substantial practical implications then a company with similar levels of firm variables two
years in a row should keep their debt structure constant. We have examined this by
identifying changes in debt structure and parameters and then tested, using a normal
Student's T-test, whether the observed changes are significant.
Rauh and Sufi (2010) examine in their 2010 paper if companies tend to alter their debt
structure if leverage ratio stays constant. Their approach has some similar characteristics, but
their motivation for the examination is somewhat different as they do not do any significance
test on their result. Rauh and Sufi (2010) state that a 2.5% change in leverage ratio is too
small to claim there to actually be an alteration to the leverage ratio, thus they regard all
changes below 2.5% to be not significant. We have eased somewhat on the 2.5% restriction.
This is first of all due to uncertainties related to currency effects. We need a larger wiggle
room when doing a similar test in the Nordic countries due to fluctuating currencies. Rauh
and Sufi (2010) have neglected the currency effect as a whole, an approach that could be
subject for discussion on its own. However, it is reasonable to believe that US companies
tend to have a lower fraction of debt in foreign currencies than Nordic countries. We have
thus increased the limit to 5%. All observations where change in gross leverage ratio is
greater than 5% is thus considered as years where a firm has altered the level of debt, which
might justify an alteration of the debt structure.
In addition to the gross leverage ratio firm variables are kept constant. Through our previous
regession analyses we believe that profitability, firm size and credit rating are the most
influencing firm variables when it comes to determining debt structure. We have thus
rejected all observations where the credit rating has changed between two years or where
there has been more than 5% change in firm size and profitability. Philtring our data sample
using these limitations leaves us with 13 companies. To get statistical interference from 13
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observations is difficult. The data should, nevertheless, contain interesting findings as long
as we are aware that extreme observations will have a vast impact on the estimated figures.
To determine whether the different debt categories have changed, even if the most important
parameters have remained constant, we make the assumption that expected change in
utilization of any particular debt category should be zero if the firm variables stay constant.
Using the Student's t-test we are then able to test whether the observed changes are
significant.
In the test we use the average of the absolute changes in percentage point. Thus a company
chancing its fraction of utilized bank debt from 18% to 20% yields the same average change
as a company changing the fraction of utilized bank debt from 2% to 4%. The average of the
13 observations leases us with a sample mean which is the mean change in utilization of
different debt classes.
The Student's- test projects a t-value through the equation: = (5c-— , where t is
the sample mean, 1.1is the expected mean, s is the sample standard deviation and n the
number of observations. We test whether the t-value is significant through the hypotheses:
HO:Expected mean equals zero
HA:Expected mean is not equal to zero
To justify the use of the t-test we must assume that change in utilization of a particular debt
class is normally distributed. Claiming that the observations are normally distributed should
prove to be a fair assumption because we are assessing the changes in utilization, and not the
utilization level in itself. Due to our low number of observations we have, however, no
opportunity to examine whether this assumption is valid. The test should still prove to yields
an interesting insight.
4.3.1 Findings
Table 14 presents a summary of the average change in debt utilization, the associated
standard deviation, and the maximum and minimum values of the sample.
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TABLE 14 - AVERAGES AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Thefollowing table presents the average change in debt structure, the associated standard deviation
of the sample, and the highest and the lowest value within the sample, in the years where certain
criteria's have been met. The criteria 's being that the observed changes in debt utilization when
corporate rating remains unchanged, change in gross leverage ratio, profitability andfirm size is 5%
at a maximum.
Averages and standard deviation - 13 observations
Average St.dev Max Min
Gross debt -0.008 0.016 0.021 -0.031
Sales 0.001 0.042 0.050 -0.050
Profitability 0.001 0.005 0.010 -0.006
Bank loans
-0.109 0.290 0.188 -0.984
Bonds 0.005 0.031 0.090 -0.035
Program 0.081 0.282 0.980 -0.202
Mortgage 0.008 0.085 0.261 -0.137
Convertible 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mezzanine 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other 0.015 0.056 0.153 0.047
Secured 0.011 0.085 0.261 -0.137
Sen.Unsec.
-0.041 0.119 0.119 -0.271
Subord. -0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.011
Public 0.110 0.270 0.980 -0.300
Table 14 indicates that the average change in gross debt, sales and profitabilityis low,
-0.008,0.001 and 0.001respectively.This, however,is as expectedbecausewe discardall
observationswherechangeis greaterthan5%.Thestandarddeviationsalsohavelowvalues.
They do indicate, however, that there is some variation even if we limit the sample to
observationslowerthan5%.
Bank loans have the highest averagechange in magnitudethe differentdebt instruments,
being -10.9%.This is mainlydue to one observationwherebank loansdecreaseby 98.54%.
The standarddeviationis thus rather large;being29.0%Bondsremainrather constantwith
an averagechangeof 0.5% and a standarddeviationof 3.1%. Programdebt, on the other
hand has an averagechangeof 8.1%,mainlydue to one observationwhere programdebt
increaseby 98.0%.The standarddeviationis thus at the same level as bank loans, being
28.2%
The otherdebt instrumentschangelittle on average.Mortgageand otherdebthave average
changes of 0.8% and 1.5% respectively, whereas there are no observed changes to
convertiblesandmezzanine.
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Secured, senior unsecured and subordinated debt changes 1.1%, -4.1% and -0.2% on
average,with standarddeviationsbeing 8.5%.Publicdebthas the highestaveragechangeof
all the debt classes,with an averagechangeof 11%.The standarddeviationis also amongst
the highestbeing27%.
The sampleaveragesand standarddeviationsdescribedaboveyieldsp-valuesas presentedin
table 15.
TABLE 15 - P-VALUES
The tablepresents the p - value derivedfrom Studen't T- tests.
Firm Variables P-value
Bank loan 0.202
Bonds 0.600
Program 0.325
Mortgage 0.731
Other 0.353
Secured 0.655
Sen.Unsec. 0.242
Subord. 0.160
Public 0.191
***,** and * denotessignificance
of the t-tests at the 1%,5% and
10%level, respectively
4.3.2 Discussion of findings
The results from the t-test show no significantp-values.This does not imply that we can
discard the alternativehypothesiseand claim that firms do not alter their utilizationrate.
Assessingtable 14and 15does,however,makeus drawsomeinterestingtrainof thoughts.
The onlydebt instrumentsthat showsaveragechangesgreaterthan the 5% limitwe initially
usedas philtreto reducethe sampleto 13observationsarebank loansandprogramdebt.The
other instrumentsshow small averagechangesand small standarddeviationsgiving very
large p-values.Both programdebt and bank loans, however,are heavily influencedby an
extremeobservation,being the DanishcompanyISS A/S, which retired a revolvingcredit
programby issuingmedium-termnotesin 2003.Dueto our lownumberof observations,this
incidencehas a geat influenceon our averagesand standarddeviations.If this observation
wouldhave been taken out of the account,the averagechangewouldhave been -3,5% and
0,56%forbankloansandprogramdebt,respectively.
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The resultspresentedin table 14 and 15 underpinsthe results comingfrom our regression
models in section 4.2, as it indicatesthat rating, profitabilityand firm size are the most
prominent firm variables.On averagefirms do not alter their utilizationof differentdebt
classesas longas thesevariablesstayconstant.
4.4 Examinationoffallenangels
As an additionalassessmenton what determinesdebt structurewe have examinedNordic
rated companiesthat have been downgradedfrom investmentgradeto speculativegradeat
somepointbetween2001and2011.Suchfirmsare called fallenangels'.Thisassessmentis
interestingin severalways.Thecoherencebetweencreditratingand debtstructureis proven
through several empirical studies, amongst them Rauh and Sufi (2007 & 2010). A
downgade from investmentgrade to speculativegrade is the credit rating action that
supposedlyhas the most implicationsfor corporatefundingas severalinstitutionalinvestors
are prohibitedfrom owningspeculativepapers. This shouldindicatethat fallenangelswill
alter their debt structureat somepoint after the downgradebecausethe firmsmeet a new
typeof investorsoncethe downgradedis a fact.
We have assessedthis aspectby comparingthe developmentof the debt structureof Nordic
fallen angelsto the firmsthat are not downgaded. We have in additionconstructeda new
multivariateregressionmodelon the basisof oneof the initialmultivariatemodelwe usedin
section 4.2. The model is expandedwith three dummy variables. One dummy variable
represents the year of downgrade,one representsthe year after the downgradeand one
representsthe secondyearafterthe downgrade.If thereare a significantlychangein the debt
structure due to a companybecoming a fallen angel we would expect the coefficients
associatedto thesedummyvariablesto be significant.
The final sample of fallen angel firms in the Nordic consistsof Norske Skogindustrier,
ReykjavikEnergy,Metsa Board, Stora Enso and UPM. Four out of five companiesthus
belongsto the pulp and paper industry.Henceour figures are clearlybiased towardsthis
industry.Five companiesis way few companiesto get statisticalinterference,thuswe have
not performedany hypothesistest, and instead assessedthe averagesand discussedthe
development.
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As seen from the table 16 there does not seem to be a clear indicationon how companies
react the same year as they are downgaded. The most prominentchange is observedfor
bonds,whichincreasesby 4.1% in average.The followingtwo year does not seemto yield
any majorchangesin debt structureeither,and it it's difficultto spota trend. Bankloans for
instant decreaseby 7.6% in average one year after the downgade, but then increasesby
7.1%the secondyear.
A possibleexplanationwhycompaniesdo not seemto altertheirdebt structureafterthey are
downgradecan be proactivemanagement.There are done several studies on credit rating
effect on shareprice. Morsethand Nørgaard(2011)revealedthat the significantchange in
shareprice is muchhigherwhena companyis put on watchby the creditratingagency,than
when it actually gets downgraded.The downgradeitself only yields a small, and barely
significant,change.This indicatesthat the marketis somewhatproactive,and it's reasonable
to assumethe company'smanagementto be the same,especiallybecausemanagementhave
the insideradvantagedoverthe market.
Table 16 presents the change in debt utilization for the two year leading up to the
downgrade.However,the table do not reveal any clearpatternleadingup to the downgrade.
Bankdebt,for instantincreaseby as muchas 16.3%twoyearsprior to the downgrade,but is
reducedby 4%the followingyear.
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TABLE 16 - DEBT UTILIZATION AFTER A FALLEN ANGEL DOWNGRADE
Thetablepresentsfiguresillustratingthe absolutenumberof averageannualchangeindebtutilization
for a fallenangel.All figuresare in percentageof total debt. The numberin bracketsrepresentsthe
standarddeviationto the observations.t describesthe year of the downgrade.t+1 indicatesthe year
afterthe downgrade,whilstt+2 indicatesthe secondyearafterthedowngrade.t-1 andt-2 indicatesthe
twoyearsleadingup to thedowngrade
Changein debtstructure forFallenAngels
Downgrade
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Bank Loans 0.163 -0.040 0.021 -0.076 0.071
	
(0.072) (0.073) (0.035) (0.056) (0.168)
Bonds -0.111 0.026 0.041 0.045 -0.041
	
(0.055 ) (0.037) (0.059) (0.102) (0.207)
Program Debt -0.044 0.015 -0.032 0.028 0.007
	
( 0.017 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.072 )
MBS
-0.004 -0.007 -0.003
-0.007 0.000
	
( 0.000 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.008 )
Convertibles -
Mezzanine
-
Other
-0.004 0.037 0.004 0.010 -0.037
	
( 0.061 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.033 )
SecuredDebt -0.004 -0.003
-0.003 -0.006 0.005
	
( 0.009 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.008 )
SeniorUnsecured 0.008 -0.016 0.004 -0.010 0.001
	
( 0.039 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.079 ) ( 0.025 )
SubordinatedDebt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
	
( 0.017 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Public 0.025 0.025 -0.029 0.056 -0.057
	
( 0.046 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.064 )
In addition to just looking at absolute changes in utilization,we have also computeda
multivariateregressionin order to examineif there mightbe contextsthat are obscuredby
otherfactors,suchas changingfirmvariables.Wehavethus computeda regressionequation
on the basis of our initial multivariateregressionmodel and added a dummyvariables
indicatingthe yearof the downgradeandthe followingtwoyears.
Theregressionequationwe haveusedis
Debty = po+ f31(EBIT/Sales) + 132(Ln(Sales)) + f33(Intangibile asset ratio)
+ 163(Dummy variable for listing) + fl4(Dummy variable for rating)
+ MFallen Angel) + fl4(FA + 1) + fl4(FA + 2) + Ei
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TABLE 17 - REGRESSION TAKING FALLEN ANGEL FACTOR INTO ACCOUNT
Panel A - Debt instruments


( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Parameters Bank Bonds Program M ortgage Convertible Mezzanine Other
EBIT/Sales -0.084*** -0.038** 0.028** -0.026** -0.016**


( 0.005 )


( 0.019 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.004 )


0.040
Ln(Sales) -0.023** 0.000 0.033*** -0.010*** -0.012***


0.020***


(0.009 ) (0.008) ( 0.010) ( 0.004 ) (0.002)


(0.010)
Intangibility ratio 0.056 -0.170*** 0.233*** -0.051*** 0.016*


-0.081***


( 0.041 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.010)


( 0.005 )
Listed -0.044 0.009 -0.041 -0.015 0.014*


0.074***


( 0.033 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.008 )


( 0.022 )
Rated -0.229*** 0.050* 0.184*** 0.007 0.015


-0.020


(0.033) (0.029) ( 0.035 ) (0.013 ) ( 0.008 )


( 0.018)
Fallen Angel 0.225 -0.011 -0.164 -0.040 -0.021


0.005


(0.122) (0.108) (0.132) (0.049) (0.029)


( 0.017 )
FA +1 0.137 0.043 -0.131 -0.046 -0.020


0.017


(0.122) (0.108) (0.132) (0.049) (0.029)


( 0.065 )
FA +2 0.198 0.027 -0.140 -0.048 -0.019


-0.012


(0.122) (0.108) (0.132) (0.049) (0.029)


( 0.065 )
Constant 0.657*** 0.218*** -0.132* 0.146*** 0.094***


-( 0.040)


( 0.074 ) ( 0.065 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.030 ) ( 0.017 )


0.065
R2 adj. 0.162 0.078 0.163 0.076 0.077


0.115
and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel B - Seniority & Public/Private
EBIT/Sales
Ln(Sales)
( 8 )
Secured
-0.072***
0.015
-0.046***
( 9 )
Sen.Unsec
-0.063
( 0.020 )
0.024
( 10)
Subordin.
0.027***
( 0.006 )
0.021***
( 11)
Public
0.020
( 0.081 )
0.041***
( 12 )
Private
-0.126***
( 0.021 )
-0.033***


0.007 ( 0.010) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.010)
Intangibility ratio ( 0.001) -0.022 0.059*** 0.082* -0.087*


0.033 ( 0.044 ) ( 0.013 ) ( 0.010) ( 0.045 )
Listed -( 0.019 ) -0.028 -0.080*** -0.033 0.019


0.027 ( 0.035 ) ( 0.010) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.037 )
Rated ( 0.006 ) 0.039 0.039*** 0.218*** -0.212***


0.026 ( 0.035 ) ( 0.010) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 )
Fallen Angel -( 0.101) 0.095 -0.012 -0.137 0.129


0.097 (0.129) (0.037) (0.036) (0.134)
FA +1 -0.104 0.083 -0.012 -0.085 0.080


(0.097) (0.129) (0.037) (0.133) (0.134)
FA +2 -0.098 0.082
-0.007 -0.134 0.134


(0.097) (0.129) (0.037) (0.133) (0.134)
Constant 0.502*** 0.509*** -0.133*** -0.110 1.061***


(0.059) (0.078) (0.022) (0.133) (0.082)
R2 adj. 0.122 0.083 0.247 0.147 0.174
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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As seen from table 17, the dummy variables introduced do not reveal any significant
relationship between whether a company turns into a fallen angels and debt structure. This is
coherent with the findings in table 16. However, our univariate and multivariate models in
section 4.2 indicates several highly significant relationships with credit rating as a whole and
debt structure. Our results in this section is thus likely to be not significant due to the low
number of observation, and this topic should thus be subject for future research where more
countries are included in order create a larger sample.
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5. Limitations and further research
The most importantlimitationin our study is the number of observationsincluded in our
sample.A numberof 370 firm year observationsare sufficientfor our tests,but as they are
dividedoveronly38 companieswe risk that our resultsarebiasedtowardsthe debt structure
of some specifictypes of companies.Whenwe dividethe datasetin smallercategories,we
face the problemof not havingenoughcompanyin each categoryto draw any conclusions
on commonfeaturesof debtstructure.
Lookingat companieswitha creditratingmayalsohavebiasedour sample.Ourconclusions
can probablynot be extendedto includeNordiccompaniesin general,as rated companiesin
the Nordicsare few, and they are likelyto possesssomejoint featuresspecificfor them. It
cannotbe ruled out that companieswith a credit ratinghave a differentdebt structurethan
othercompanies.
When examining companies that alter their debt structure when their leverage ratio is
constant,a weaknessis presentdue to the effectof differentcurrencies.The majorityof the
sample companieshave debt issues in many different currencies simultaneously,so our
figures may fail to reflect underlying fluctuations in debt structure as currencies may
appreciateor depreciatedifferently.
Writing this thesis, several topics that could be interestingfor further studies have been
discussed.As our sampleon fallen angels for Nordic countrieswas very limited, it would
havebeen interestingto includea largergeographicalarea and followthe samemethodology
to investigatetheir debt structure.Furthermore,other propertiesof corporatedebt structure
could have been interestingto examine.First of all, the propertiesof debt maturitycould
have been examined for Nordic countries.Many empirical studies have been conducted
regardingthis in the U.S., and an assessmentof this in the Nordicscouldhave elaboratedon
the alreadystylizedfacts.
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6. Conclusions
This study investigates Nordic credit rated companies' debt structure, and seeks to determine
which measurable, firm specific variables that can be used to explain corporate debt
structure. We have identified a sample of 38 companies that have held a long-term credit
rating by Moody's Investor Services prior to 2012. Through annual reports, databases and
other publicly available information, we have developed an extensive dataset describing the
debt structure of the sample companies for 11 years from 2001 through 2011.
Based on multivariate regressions, a detailed analysis of the relationships between firm
specific variables and different types of debt has been conducted. The results indicate that
several firm specific variables are determining the debt structure of Nordic companies with a
credit rating. The most influential variables based on our findings are profitability, firm size,
intangibility and rating.
As the pecking order theory predicts, profitability is significantly affecting the utilization of
bank loans, as well as mortgage debt for the companies in the sample. Our research on
Nordic companies with a credit rating shows that a reduced profitability will increase a
company's fraction of bank debt to total debt. In addition, a negative relationship between
mortgage debt and profitability exists. A decrease in profitability will increase the utilization
of mortgage debt, especially when the profitability is negative.
The results indicate that empirical established relationships in relation to firm size also are
present in our sample. Our dataset shows a positive correlation between firm size and
utilization of public debt. Program debt is the main reason why this relationship applies for
rated companies in the Nordics.
We cannot identify any relationship between bank debt and the level of intangibility. This
indicates that bank monitoring can function as a substitute for collateral, as demonstrated by
previous research. A positive relationship between tangibility and leverage ratio has also
been established by earlier empirical studies, and our findings indicate that this positive
relationship mainly is derived by the accessibility of mortgage loans.
Our data indicates that the motivation behind obtaining a credit rating is access to arms-
length market debt. Nordic company, when rated, increases its level of public debt to total
debt substantially.
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When assessing `fallen angels' we were not able to determine any significant trends in debt
alteration due to the downgrade. This is believed to be due to a limited sample.
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8. Appendix
8.1 Creditratingsymbols
TABLE 18-CREIXT RATINGSYMBOLSUSEDBY THELARGESTCREDITRATINGAGENCIES
Overview of the rating syrnbolsapplied by the three largest credit rating agencies
Sources: S&P (2012), Moody's (2012) and Fitch (2012)


Symbol


Description
Moody's S&P Fitch


Aaa AAA AAA Prime
Aal AA+ AA+


Aa2 AA AA Highgrade
Aa3 AA- AA-


A1 A+ A+


A2 A A Uppermediumgrade
A3 A- A-


Baal BBB+ BBB+


Baa2 BBB BBB Lowermediumgrade
Baa3 BBB- BBB-


Bal BB+ BB+



Non-investmentgrade
Ba2 BB BB speculative
Ba3 BB- BB-


B1 B+ B+


B2 B B Highlyspeculative
B3 B- B-


Caal CCC+


Substantialrisks
Caa9
 CCC+


Extremelyspeculative
Caa3 CCC- CCC


Ca CC
c


In defaultwithlittleprospect
for recovery
c D DDD



DD In default


D


Investment
Grade
Speculative
Grade
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TABLE 19- RATING SYMBOLS USED BY MOODY'S
Overview of credit rating symbols used by Moody's
Source: Moody's (2012)
S mbol Descri tion
Aaa Obligations rated Aaa arejudged to be of the highest quality, subject to the lowest levelof credit risk
Aa Obligations rated Aa arejudged to bo of high quality and are subject to very low credit risk
Obligations rated A arejudgx1 to be upper-medium grade and are subject to low credit risk
Obligations rated Baa arejudged to be medium-gradeand subject to moderate credit risk an as such mayBaa
posses certain speculative characteristics
Ba Obligations rated Ba arejudged to be speculative and are subject to substantial credit risk
Obligationsrated B are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk
Obligations rated Caa arejudged to be speculative ofpoor standing and are subjective to very highCaa
credit risk
Ca Obligations rated Ca are highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect
of recovery of principal and interest
Obligationsrated C are the lowest rated and are typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of
principal or interest
100
8.2 Sampleof companies
TABLE 20- FINAL SAMPLE
The selection offirms included in the study with the corresponding type of rating used in the analysis. Firms
are listed alphabetically, sorted by country, with issueyear and theyear the respective rating was withdrawnil.
Source: Moody's (2012)
Panel A- Final sample companies from Norway
Company Issued Withdrawn Type ofrating
NorskHydroASA 2007 No LTIssuerRating


1999 No LT IssuerRatingNorgesStatsbanerAS
NorskeSkogindustrierASA 2006 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
PetroleumGeo-ServicesASA 2007 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SongaOffshoreSE 2010 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
StatkraftSF 2003 2004 LTIssuerRating
TelenorASA 1996 No SeniorUnsecured
YaraInternationalASA 2004 No LT IssuerRating
Panel B - Final sample companies from Sweden
Company Issued Withdrawn Type ofrating
ABVolvo 2005 No LT IssuerRating
AlfaLavalHoldingAB 2004 2005 LTIssuerRating
AtlasCopcoAB 1998 No SeniorUnsecured
ElectroluxAB 1989 1992 SeniorUnsecured
NobinaAB 2000 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
PreemHoldingsAB 2001 2005 LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SaabAB 1989 1992 SeniorUnsecured
SASAB 2004 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SecuritasAB 2000 2008 SeniorUnsecured
SKFAB 1992 No SeniorUnsecured
SongNetworks 1999 2003 LTCorporateFamilyRatings
StenaAB 1999 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SvenskaCellulosaAkt. SCA 1994 No SeniorUnsecured
SwedishMatchAB 1999 No SeniorUnsecured
TeliaSoneraAB 1999 No SeniorUnsecured
VattenfallAB 1995 No LTIssuerRating
11 LT= Long-term
Panel C - Final sample companies from Denmark
Com an Issued Withdrawn T e ofratin
CarlsbergBreweriesA/S 2006 No LTIssuerRating
DONGEnergyA/S 2004 No LTIssuerRating
ISSA/S 2006 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
NovoNordiskA/S 2004 No LTIssuerRating
TDCA/S 2011 No LTIssuerRating
Panel D - Final sample companies from Iceland
Com an Issued Withdrawn T e of ratin
Landsvirkjun 1998 No BACKEDSeniorUnsecured
ReykjavikEnergy 2007 No LTIssuerRating
Panel E- Final sample companies from Finland
Com an Issued Withdrawn T e of ratin
ElisaCorporation 2000 No LTIssuerRating
FingridOyj 1999 No SeniorUnsecured
FortumOyj 2002 No LTIssuerRating
MetsaBoardCorporation 2003 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
NokiaOyj 2009 No SeniorUnsecured
StoraEnsoOyj 2008 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
UPM-Kymmene 2009 No LTCorporateFamilyRatings
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TABLE 21- COMPANIESEXCLUDEDFROMTHEFINALSAMPLE
The selection offirms omittedfrom the study with the correspondingreasonfor excluding them is presented.
The companies are listed alphabetically, sorted by country.
Panel A- Excluded companies from Norway
Company
AkerKvaernerAS
AkerKvaernerO&GGroupAS
DetNorskeOljeselskapAS
EnitelASA
FindexaII AS
FrontierDrillingASA
NorthernOffshoreASA
OceanRigNorwayAS
SagaPetroleumASA
SchlumbergerNorgeAS
StatholdingAS
StatoilASA
TricoShippingAS
Type of rating
BACKEDSeniorUnsecured
LTIssuerRating
SeniorUnsecured
LTIssuerRating
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SeniorUnsecured
BACKEDSeniorUnsecured
BACKEDSeniorUnsecuredMTN
SeniorUnsecured
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
Reasonfor omission
No availableannualreports
No availableannualreports
Not sufficientinformation
No availableannualreports
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Subsidiarywithinsufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
No availableannualreports
Panel B - Excluded companies from Sweden
Company
AseaCapitalCorpBV
AssiDomanAB
CorralInvestmentAB
CorralPetroleumHoldingsAB
DometicGroupAB
DometicKoncernAB
EsselteGroupHoldingsAB
FortumPowerandHeatAB
Mo ochDomsjoAB
NorcellSwedenHolding2 AB(publ)
OctaphannaNordicAB
OrlenCapitalAB
TelefonaktiebolagetLM Ericsson
Type ofrating
BACKEDSeniorUnsecured
SeniorUnsecured
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
SeniorUnsecured
SeniorUnsecured
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
LTIssuerRating
SeniorUnsecuredMTN
SeniorUnsecured
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
LTCorporateFamilyRatings
BACKEDSeniorUnsecured
SeniorUnsecured
Reasonforomission
No availableannualreports
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
Subsidiarywithinsufficientinformation
Subsidiaryof FortumOyj
Not sufficientinformation
Subsidiarywithinsufficientinformation
No issuesin SDCPlatinum
Not sufficientinformation
Not sufficientinformation
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I Panel C - Excluded companies from Denmark
Com an T e of ratin Reasonfor omission
AngelLuxCommonS.A. LTCorporateFamilyRatings Not sufficientinformation
CPKelcoAps LTIssuerRating Not sufficientinformation
ElsamI/S SeniorUnsecured Not sufficientinformation
EnergiE2A/S SeniorUnsecured Not sufficientinfonnation
NaturgasMidt/NordI/S SeniorUnsecuredMTN Not sufficientinformation
NycomedA/S LTCorporateFamilyRatings Not sufficientinformation
SKPowerCompany SeniorUnsecured Not sufficientinformation
Panel D - Excluded companies from Finland
Com an T e of ratin Reasonforomission
DyneaInternationalOy LTIssuerRating No issuesin SDCPlatinum
KemiraOyj SeniorUnsecured Not sufficientinformation
TeollisuudenVoimaOy SeniorUnsecured Not sufficientinformation
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8.3 NACE-classification
TABLE 22- NACE-CLASSIFICATION OF SAMPLECOMPANIES
The tablepresents the sample companies and their correspondingNACE-classification. The companies are
listed alphabetically, sorted by country.
Source: NACE (2012)
Panel A- NACE-classification,Norway
Company
NorskHydroASA
NorgesStatsbanerAS
NorskeSkogindustrierASA
PetroleumGeo-ServicesASA
SongaOffshoreSE
StatkraftSF
TelenorASA
YaraInternationalASA
NACE-classification
C Manufacturing
Transportingandstorage
C Manufacturing
Miningandquarrying
Miningandquarrying
Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
J Informationandcommunication
C Manufacturing
Panel B - NACE-classification,Sweden
Company
ABVolvo
AlfaLavalHoldingAB
AtlasCopcoAB
ElectroluxAB
NobinaAB
PreemHoldingsAB
SaabAB
SASAB
SecuritasAB
SKFAB
SongNetworks
StenaAB
SvenskaCellulosaAkt. SCA
SwedishMatchAB
TeliaSoneraAB
VattenfallAB
NACE-classification
Wholesaleandretailtrade;repairof motorvehiclesandmotorcycles
C Manufacturing
C Manufacturing
C Manufacturing
Transportingandstorage
Wholesaleandretailtrade;repairof motorvehiclesandmotorcycles
C Manufacturing
Transportingandstorage
Administrativeandsupportserviceactivities
C Manufacturing
J Informationandcommunication
Unclassified
C Manufacturing
Wholesaleandretailtrade;repairofmotorvehiclesandmotorcycles
J Informationandcommunication
Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
Panel C - NACE-classification, Denmark
Com an NACE-classification
CarlsbergBreweriesA/S G Wholesaleandretailtrade;repairofmotorvehiclesandmotorcycles
DONGEnergyA/S D Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
ISSA/S N Administrativeandsupport serviceactivities
NovoNordiskA/S C Manufacturing
TDCA/S J Informationandcommunication
Panel D - NACE-classification, Iceland
Com an NACE-classification
Landsvirkjun D Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
ReykjavikEnergy D Electricity,gas,steammd airconditioningsupply
Panel E- NACE-classification, Finland
Com an NACE-classification
ElisaCorporation J Informationandcommunication
FingridOyj D Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
FortumOyj D Electricity,gas,steamandairconditioningsupply
MetsaBoardCorporation C Manufacturing
NokiaOyj - Unclassified
StoraEnsoOyj C Manufacturing
UPM-Kymmene C Manufacturing
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TABLE
23-
YEAR
EFFECTS
ON
DEBT
STRUCTURE
8.4
Regression
model
with
year
effects
Panel A - Year effect on debt utilization
Instruments 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008
F.4C, sz
o ,.- 2 ?. 2
	
2006 2007 2009 2010 2011
	 (%
,-,.''oBank -0.078 -0.150 -0.082 -0.063 -0.048 0.035 0.030 -0.008 0.011 0.015 -,
';''.
Bonds 0.006 0.013 0.044 -0.007 0.003 -0.067 -0.082 -0.064 -0.077 -0.059
Program -0.057 0.036 -0.016 -0.012 -0.021 -0.012 -0.023 0.002 -0.003 0.003.
t).' 0  '?:. ''''.  
M ortgage 0.043 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.034 0.018 0.024 0.020 0.021
Convertible 0.017 0.004 0.000 -0.009 -0.004 0.002 0.013 0.017 0.007 0.000
.' 

i:
0 (p
Mezzanine 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.004***,-,...
Other 0.023 0.032 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.024 0.008 -0.007 0.008 -0.010o '
(o ep
. 

':-- c.,Co

*** ** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
I.?..
o 

,..,.. 
c,-
,„. ,,,, ,„ .....
z
cr...
,
Panel B - Year effect on debt seniority and public/private z ?....,,,,, .....2
‘:"..''r"
sa • c-,z7s-4.}:
`..."-
Instruments 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
7-. o
'';''' g'•4. (-)
....,..,..Secured 0.074 0.045 0.060 0.090 0.099 0.098 0.064 0.065 0.090 0.095
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FIGURE 4 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECTS
Figure 4 presents changes in the year effects on different debt instruments
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FIGURE 5 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECTS
Figure 5 presents changes in the year effects on different seniorities and public/private debt
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8.5 Regressionmodelwithyear, industryandfinancial
effects
TABLE 24- YEAR, INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL CRISIS EFFECTS ON DEBT STRUCTURE
Panel A comprises of the coefficients describing the industry effects on different debt instruments.Panel B
comprises of the coefficients describing the year effects on different debt instruments
Panel Cpresents the coefficients describing the industry effects on different seniorities andpublic/private debt.
Panel D comprises of the coefficients describing the industry effects on different seniorities andpublic/private
debt. "*" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 10% significant level. "**" indicates that the
coefficient is significant at a 5% significance level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1%
significance level. No asterisks signal that the coefficient is not significant All the coefficients are based on
370 observations
Panel A- Industry effect on debt instruments
Instruments NACE B NACE C NACE D NACE G NACE H NACE J NACE N
Bank 0.101 -0.105 -0.122* -0.066 -0.266*** -0.168** -0.140*
Bonds -0.008 0.257*** 0.027 0.104* 0.011 0.001 -0.013
Program 0.125 0.061 0.346 0.230*** 0.423*** 0.454*** 0.258***
Mortgage -0.245*** -0.231*** 0.295*** -0.223*** -0.242*** -0.250*** 0.217***
Convertible 0.069*** -0.007 -0.017 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.061
Mezzanine 0.014 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003
Other -0.026 0.013 0.065* -0.075 0.064 -0.062 0.031
Panel B -Year effect on debt instruments when implimenting industry variables
Instrumetns Yearl 1 Yearl0 Year09 Year08 Year07 Year06 Year05 Year04 Year03 Year02
Bank -0.065 -0.154 -0.089 -0.072 -0.060 0.021 0.067 0.029 0.045 0.000
Bonds 0.008 0.024 0.043 -0.007 0.007 -0.062 -0.003 0.012 -0.004 -0.063
Progam 0.001 0.074 0.035 0.039 0.027 0.039 -0.056 -0.029 -0.028 0.060
Mortgage -0.002 0.006 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.007 -0.028 -0.022 -0.026 -0.005
Convertible 0.024 0.009*** 0.007*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.006 0.060 0.065 0.054 0.004
Mezzanine -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.000
Other 0.025 0.036 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.022 -0.060 -0.076 -0.058 -0.006
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level,respectively
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Panel C - Industry effect on seniority
Instruments NACE B NACE C NACE D NACE G NACE H NACE J NACE N
Secured 0.481*** -0.183*** -0.245*** -0.044 -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.237***
Sen.Unsec -0.495*** 0.144 0.108 -0.041 -0.013 0.143 0.135
Subordin. 0.212*** 0.045** 0.131*** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.027** 0.053
Public 0.367*** 0.493*** 0.376*** 0.485*** 0.601*** 0.801*** 0.130
Private -0.348*** -0.503*** -0.351*** -0.513*** -0.614*** -0.819*** -0.142
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
Panel D - Year effect on seniority and public/private debt when implimenting industry variables
Instruments Yearl 1 Yearl 0 Year09 Year08 Year07 Year06 Year05 Year04 Year03 Year02
Secured 0.058 0.010 0.032 0.057 0.051 0.045 0.039 0.040 0.056 0.038
Sen.Unsec -0.098 -0.031 -0.012 -0.081 -0.079 -0.069 -0.084 -0.083 -0.104 -0.068
Subordin. 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.024 0.007 0.014 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 0.010
Public 0.023 0.025 0.080 0.052 0.096 0.060 -0.008 0.040 0.035 0.022
Private
-0.031 -0.035 -0.085 -0.055 -0.101 -0.065 -0.001 -0.058 -0.044 -0.031
***,** and * denotessignificanceof the t-tests at the 1%,5% and 10%level, respectively
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FIGURE 6 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECT ON DEBT
Figure 6presents changes in the year effects on different debt instruments when industry andfinancial
crisis are implemented as dummy variables in the regression equation
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FIGURE 7 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECT ON DEBT
Figure 6 presents changes in the year effects on different seniorities and public/private debt when
industry andfinancial crisis are implemented as dummy variables in the regression equation
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TABLE 25- YEAR, INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND COUNTRY EFFECTS ON DEBT
STRUCTURE
Panel A comprises of the coefficients describing the industry effects on different debt categories. Panel B
comprises of the coefficients describing the country effects on different debt categories. Panel Cpresents the
coefficients describing the year effects on different debt categories. "*" indicates that the coefficient is
significant at a 10% significant level. "**" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 5% significance
level. "***" indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 1% significance level. No asterisks signal that the
coefficient is not significant. All the coefficients are based on 370 observations
Panel A - Industry effects on debt structure when including country variables


NACE1 NACE2 NACE3 NACE4 NACE5 NACE6 NACE7
Bank 0.188 1.123* -0.244*** -0.078 -0.233*** -0.182** 1.123**
Bonds -0.136 0.266*** 0.098* 0.154*** 0.002 -0.001 0.028
Program 0.166 0.082 0.382*** 0.263*** 0.426*** 0.487*** 0•337***
Mortgage -0.293*** -0.265*** -0.296*** -0.288*** -0.285*** -0.283*** -0.287***
Convertible 0.088*** -0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.067
Mezzanine 0.004 -0.001 0.029 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.015
Other 0.018 0.022 0.054 -0.067* 0.077* -0.051 0.044
Secured 0.414** -0.214*** -0.224*** -0.096*** -0.213** -0.193*** -0.279***
Sen.Unsec -0.513*** 0.165** 0.107 0.034 0.002 0.161** 0.222***
Subordin. 0.235*** 0.052*** 0.147*** 0.078*** 0.089*** 0.035* 0.048**
Public -0.070 0.240*** 0.307*** 0.407*** 0.345*** 0.527*** 0.332***
Private 0.101 -0.247*** -0.292*** -0.425*** -0.350*** -0.535*** -0.347***
Panel B - Country effects on debt structure


Sweden Denmark Iceland Finland
Bank 0.002 0.258*** 0.333 0.050
Bonds -0.156 -0.220*** -0.306 -0.017
Program 0.030 -0.231*** 0.038 -0.026
Mortgage 0.052 0.148*** -0.075 -0.045
Convertible 0.030 0.000 0.008 0.009
Mezzanine 0.011 0.049*** -0.027 0.000
Other 0.027 -0.003 0.084 0.016
Secured 0.033 0.036 -0.121 -0.071**
Sen.Unsec -0.141*** -0.285*** 0.043 -0.028
Subordin. 0.050*** 0.046*** -0.025 0.029**
Public -0.242*** -0.422*** -0.183*** -0.275***
Private 0.238*** 0.423*** 0.228*** 0.265***
Panel C - Year effects on debt structure when including country variables


Yearll Year10 Year09 Year08 Year07 Year06 Year05 Year04 Year03 Year02
Bank 0.020 0.082 0.071 0.107 0.039 -0.039 -0.040 -0.060 -0.131 -0.043
Bonds -0.067 -0.027 -0.017 -0.029 -0.067 -0.001 -0.026 0.029 0.017 0.000
Program 0.050 -0.019 -0.020 -0.046 0.032 0.020 0.027 0.022 0.066 -0.007
Mortgage -0.010 -0.050** -0.046 -0.054** 0.001 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.001 -0.007
Convertible 0.003 0.055 0.067*** 1.123*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.023
Mezzanine 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.012 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
Other -0.005 -0.046 -0.063 -0.047 -0.020 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.038 0.027
Secured 0.027 0.027 0.010 0.008 0.033 0.040 0.047 0.022 0.001 0.049
Sen.Unsec -0.067 -0.085 -0.066 -0.065 -0.068 -0.079 -0.087 -0.017 -0.027 -0.095
Subordin. 0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.007 0.024 0.002 -0.001 0.004
Public -0.057 -0.111 -0.093 -0.151* -0.057 -0.008 -0.020 0.003 0.035 -0.019
Private 0.051 0.112 0.093 0.155 0.054 0.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.038 0.015
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FIGURE 8 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECTS ON DEBT STRUCTURE
Figure 8 presents changes in the year effects on different debt instruments when industry, financial
crisis and country are implemented as dummy variables in the regression equation
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FIGURE 9 —DEVELOPMENT OF YEAR EFFECTS ON DEBT STRUCTURE
Figure 9 presents changes in the year effects on different debt seniority and public/private debt when
industry,financial crisis and country are implemented as dummy variables in the regression equation
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